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# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
East Europe

*FBIS-EEU-96-155* 9 August 1996

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**Albania: FYROM Envoy Rejects Resolution on Tetovo Rector**

*AU0808175196 Tirana ATA in English 1025 GMT 8 Aug 96*

["Announcement of Albanian Foreign Ministry Spokesman"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 7 (ATA)—"The ambassador of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in Albania, Nikolla Teodorcevski, handed over a note to the Foreign Ministry on August 6, 1996.

"Through the note he rejects he resolution adopted by the Albanian Parliament on the imprisonment of the Tetovo University rector and its several other activists and the Albanians' demand to have the right to higher education in their mother tongue.

"He considers the resolution an interference into the home affairs of the Macedonian state, stressing that the rights of Albanians are respected in accordance with the European and international standards.

"During the meeting with the Macedonian ambassador the desire and good will characterising the Albanian state policy towards the Macedonian state was reiterated, considering this stand in the interest of bilateral relations and a contribution to peace and stability in the Balkan region.

"But, the ambassador was told that the Albanian state, based on international norms, is duty-bound to concern itself about the Albanians wherever they are, when deprived of their rights and not treated equally with the other citizens of the state they live in, more so when they are imprisoned and pursued out of an emancipating aspiration.

"Also on other occasions, the Albanian authorities have called on the good will of the Macedonian authorities to consider realistically the higher education in the mother tongue of the Albanian population, the second in number in the Macedonian state, considering it an indispensable condition for their active participation in all walks of life.

"This will, first of all, contribute to the consolidation and stability of the Macedonian state.

"Albania, as a factor of peace and stability in the region, has been and is in favour of good neighborliness with all the Balkan states, also including the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

"The respect for the human and national rights of the Albanians and the fulfillment of their demands based on international norms, and the solution of problems through dialogue are positive factors in this direction."

**Albania: Press Criticizes FYROM Note Over 'Interference'**

*AU0808132996 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 8 Aug 96 p 1*

[Commentary by A.D.: "Interest in the Albanians in Macedonia Is Our Country's Indisputable Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two days ago Nikola Todorchevski, FYROM [Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] ambassador in Tirana, addressed a protest note to our Foreign Ministry, expressing his government's objection to the resolution of our parliament against the arrest of the leaders of Tetovo University and the outlawing of this university. The Macedonian Government's protest note considered our parliament's resolution to be interference in the internal affairs of Macedonia. It also "suggested" that the Albanian Government abandon such behavior, because it does not help in the development of relations between our two countries and to stability in the region. In this way the Macedonian Government is trying to deprive our country of its indisputable right to protect the Albanians living in Macedonia and to defend their rights, which have been trampled underfoot by the Skopje authorities. However, while advising the Albanian Government to restrain itself for the sake of Albanian-Macedonian relations and stability in our region, Skopje itself must bear these very things in mind. Skopje does not seem to be considering at all, nor does it appear interested in, the indisputable reality that unless there is respect for the rights of the Albanians living on their own territory in Macedonia, there cannot be a stable Macedonia, there can be no good relations between our states, and as a result there can be no stability in the region. The fact is that the Skopje government has never ever considered the rights of the Albanians, but has thought of them as second-class citizens despite their large numbers. Macedonia's protest note mentions that "the Albanian minority enjoys all rights according to international standards," but Skopje forgets that as a percentage of the general population in Macedonia the Albanians cannot be considered a minority. They rightly demand to be a constituent element of the state.

The question of education is another delicate problem that the Albanians in Macedonia and their political parties are confronting. The events at Tetovo University and the determination and violence to which the Skopje authorities have resorted to outlaw the university show that the Skopje authorities are still guided by old political models from the days of the Karadjordjevices and the Communist regime. In this connection our state,

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too, must accept its share of the blame for not having shown from the start the proper interest in the problem of the Albanians in Macedonia, but absurdly putting relations with Macedonia before the interests of the Albanians there. The Albanian state has not exerted any form of pressure or lodged any complaint with international institutions over the violations of the rights of the Albanians in Macedonia and the rigging of the census and the elections.

The note sent by the Macedonian Government goes so far as to draw our government's attention to its failure to respect the rights of the Macedonian minority in Albania. The Macedonian Government thus demands rights for its minority in Albania while denying the Albanian Government any such right at all. At this moment, our government feels somehow in a tight squeeze because of the weakening of its international position following the events associated with the 26 May elections, over which the United States and Europe have tweaked its ear. This is no excuse, however, for neglecting the indisputable rights of our brothers in Macedonia and the former Yugoslavia in general.

**Albania: Godo Hopes To Ease 'Tense Situation' While in U.S.**

*AU0808135196 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 7 Aug 96 p 5*

[Article by Arben Vata: "Washington Causes 'Collision' Between Democrats and Republicans"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a clash of strong statements from the leaders of the Democratic Party [PD] and the Republican Party [PR] one week before the departure of their representatives to the United States, where they have been invited to tale part in the Democratic Convention, which will formally put forward Clinton's candidacy for the U.S. presidency. At a tete-a-tete meeting with journalists, PR Chairman Sabri Godo expressed his extreme dissatisfaction over the recent relations between Albania and the United States. "I am very worried about the situation that has been created in relations between Albania and the United States, which seems to me ridiculous," Godo said after his most recent meeting with senior officials of the U.S. Embassy in Tirana and after a consultation with PR Deputy Chairman Mediu, who had some meetings with the State Department last week.

However, Godo has been strongly opposed by the PD camp, this time by Albert Brojka, head of the PD's foreign relations. "We do not agree with Godo's statements, because in my opinion relations between Albania and the United States are quite normal, and as significant examples of this we can cite relations in the fields of defense, tourism, and business. These relations are continuing intensively, and are quite normal in other fields, too," Brojka said a few hours ago. Although Brojka thinks that "relations between the two countries are normal," it appears that the PR chairman will not surrender his conviction that "the state of political developments between Albania and the United States is absurd." Godo's firm proposal was that "everything must be corrected within as short a time as possible, and the only way to do this is to start dialogue at the proper level between the two states."

Brojka of the PD again reacted strongly. "Godo has his own opinions, and thinks that something needs repairing. However, in my opinion nothing needs repairing because everything is normal. Nevertheless, I appreciate Godo's wish for dialogue to Albania's benefit."

Godo also implied that there is exceptional concern on the U.S. side at the state of relations between the two countries following the bitter government statements against the United States and the president's refusal to meet senior U.S. officials. Godo did not wish to explain where U.S. concern at the course of events since 26 and 28 May lies, or which senior officials had expressed this concern. Meanwhile, Brojka fired at his target again: "The statements made by the odd senator, by Secretary of State Christopher, and by the opposition and the PR are personal comments and contain party-minded tendentiousness," was Brojka's succinct comment on the most recent U.S. statements about the political situation in Albania. Godo, concerned at what he considers the certain deterioration of Albanian-U.S. relations, said that he will try to ease as far as possible this tense situation during his visit to the United States.

**Albania: Trade Unions Demand Decisionmaking Role in Cabinet**

*AU0808184696 Tirana ATA in English 1535 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[Report by M. Kora]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 8 (ATA)—The trade unions demand to be a decision-taking partner in the government.

This was declared by the representatives of seven trade unions today in a meeting with the Labour Minister Arlinda Keci. They accused the government of disregarding them although a joint agreement has been signed between the two parties. "We shall appeal to the Constitutional Court for the disregard of the government towards us," said the president of the Trade Union Confederation of Albania, Kastriot Muco.

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According to representatives of seven trade unions, the government did not ask opinion from the trade unions when it decided to liberalize the prices of flour and wheat, a decision which they considered as unjust, because it was adopted by a group of individuals." [quotation mark as received]

"A legitimate body as the parliament decided on the compensation of the price of the bread with $2 million per month for 1,700,000 inhabitants," said Minister Keci.

Mr. Muco asked that "the whole compensation would be made on the basis of the limit of the minimal salary and the living minimum limit."

Representatives of seven trade union federations asked a working meeting soon with all ministers to discuss the decision-taking rights and tasks.

The two parties decided to meet again on September 15-20 to be informed of the final conclusions.

**Albania: PD Rejects Opposition's Conditions for Local Elections**

*AU0808171396*

[FBIS Report] Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 7 August on page three carries a 700-word report by Emin Barci entitled "Nine Parties 'Threaten' the President," describing a meeting of nine opposition parties in Tirana on 6 August and their joint statement presenting their conditions for participation in the local elections of 20 October. The paper also carries on the same page a 500-word report by E.B. under the headline "We Do Not Give Way Under Pressure," reporting the rejection of these conditions by a spokesman of the Democratic Party (PD).

Barci writes that the meeting was attended by representatives of the Democratic Alliance, the Social-Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party of the Right, the Right-Wing Republican Party, the Agrarian Party, the National Unity Party, the Popular Party, and the Ecology Party, and states: "The statement that these nine parties signed at the end of the meeting might be called 'Three Conditions for Berisha.' The conditions are drawn up in the form of criticisms that these parties level against the Decree on the Permanent Electoral Commission. 'This commission cannot be appointed by the president,' the opposition parties state. According to their declaration, Berisha has openly adopted the position of PD leader during the last four years and the opposition considers him 'one of the authors of the shambles of 26 May.' In their second criticism, the opposition parties state that the Electoral Commission 'must emerge from a consensus of the round table of political parties.'"

The report continues, "The declaration's third point states: 'A permanent commission cannot be created without clear legal support, without a law on its composition that will define its responsibilities and membership, and all the regulations for the workings of a commission of this kind.' However, the opposition's conditions do not end here. The declaration that will arrive on Berisha's desk today concludes with a demand for 'the investigation of the farce of 26 May and the establishment of dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition in accordance with the recommendations of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the U.S. State Department.' The declaration includes an evident threat to boycott the local elections. 'Unless these conditions are fulfilled, we declare that it will be impossible for us to submit to the president of the republic our proposals for the composition of this commission.' In the final analysis, the nonparticipation of the opposition in the Permanent Electoral Commission would mean that these parties would not enter any election managed and controlled by Berisha's commission. This was confirmed by Democratic Alliance Secretary Arben Imami, when he said: 'If Berisha does not accept our conditions, and if we nine opposition parties do not take part in any eventual electoral commission, I think that none of us will take part in these elections.' According to Imami, 'With this commission, Berisha is trying to turn the opposition into collaborators. But our parties will not agree to collaborate with a neodictatorship in Albania.'"

The report concludes: "The opposition parties think that the president will behave as he always has done, enforcing his decree even without the opposition. But Imami believes that Berisha has a chance to correct himself. 'In the same way as he has issued this decree, he can also decree the postponement of the elections until the legal framework is ready,' the Democratic Alliance secretary suggests."

E.B.'s second report on the same page states: "The government issued a reply even before the ink was dry on the conditions of the nine opposition parties. 'If this declaration is a form of pressure against the PD, the PD makes it clear that no concession of any kind whatsoever can be achieved through pressure.' This means that the ruling party has decided not to permit any step toward restoring our lost democracy, if the demand comes from the opposition. The excuse is simple and childish: They are putting pressure on us."

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The report continues, "The PD spokesman stated that the nine parties signing the statement 'are sure of the calamitous defeat in store for them at the local elections, and have therefore decided to boycott these elections.' This is the same logic that the one-party state used to explain the opposition's withdrawal from the 26 May elections. The PD has thus shown that it does not intend to change the rules of the game or the result of 26 May even on 20 October."

**Albania: PD on Plans of 'Centre Pole' To Boycott Local Elections**

*AU0708121496 Tirana ATA in English 1113 GMT 7 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 7 (ATA)—Democratic Party [PD] spokesman said in a statement Tuesday [6 August] that if the Centre Pole has really decided not to send the names of its representatives in the Central Election Commission, it is a sign that they, the two parties, the Democratic Alliance Party [AD] and the Social Democratic Party [PSD], consisting the Centre Pole, as well as their followers are sure of their great defeat in the local elections.

"That is why these parties have decided to boycott the local elections and interrupt their elections campaign," the PD statement said.

The PD hails Berisha's statement on the creation of the Central Election Commission and his appeal for a round table of political parties presently ruling in the local government, to discuss issues related with the Central Election Commission.

"We express our belief that local elections will be free and democratic and will assure our country a new local government despite the stand of some parties without electorate," the statement concludes.

Left opposition parties in a meeting at the PSD headquarters yesterday [6 August] decided not to send their proposals for the Central Election Commission decreed Saturday by President Berisha. They have requested that the commission be not appointed by the President but by "a round table talk among the parties."

"AD has not participated in the local elections in July 1992, although it had all possibilities to be represented" writes the daily RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE Wednesday [7 August].

PSD has a low percentage presentation in the local government. Four years ago it won less than 4 per cent of the votes. Even in the partial local government elections in 1994, the PSD could not gather more than four per cent of the ballots.

In the May 26, 1996 parliamentary elections, the PSD and AD, which frequently cooperated in a coalition, could not receive the figure of three per cent of the votes.

**Albania: Media Comments on Rumors of Nano Forming New Party**

*AU0608193796 Tirana ATA in English 0947 GMT 6 Aug 96*

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 5 (ATA)—The idea of creating a new party by the Socialist Party [PS] leader Fatos Nano has days that circulates in the Albanian media.

The left wing daily KOHA JONE said the PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi has stated it in a close meeting of the PS Leading Committee of Tirana branch.

"Fatos Nano will create a new party," has Pellumbi stated according the daily KOHA JONE.

Pandeli Majko, one of Nano's supporters, when asked about Pellumbi's statement, said: "This is to see dreams in day light."

"If this saying is true, then it is a provocation," said Majko, adding that his own opinion will be pronounced if this statement would become public.

Pellumbi negates to have made such a statement.

"I do not deal with newspaper's statements, especially with those of KOHA JONE. I do not comment any of its statements, as they are all articles to sell the paper," Pellumbi said.

The split inside the PS has started after May 26 elections, when the PS leader Fatos Nano, in jail for corruption and falsification of documents, sent a motion from the jail for a renovation of his party.

The PS Leading Committee in one of its meeting rejected with a vote majority its leader's motion, which was supported by a minority.

Later on, Nano sent two other messages, in one of which he strongly accused the two PS deputy chairmen Pellumbi and Dokle.

Sources inside the PS speak about a third message of Nano still unknown.

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**Albania: Justice Minister, German, Italian Envoys Discuss Ties**

*AU0808184796 Tirana ATA in English 1608 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 8 (ATA)—Albanian Justice Minister Kristofor Peci today had separate working meetings with the ambassador of Germany, Hans Peter Disdorn, and the ambassador of Italy, Paolo Foresti, accredited in Tirana.

In the meeting Mr. Disdorn voiced the readiness of the government and the institutions of the German justice to help the system of Albanian justice. The German party will provide assistance for the Magistrature School and for the Penitentiary School which will function in the future.

Minister Peci spoke of a further cooperation in the field of justice and asked possible assistance for the training of Albanian judges, for the system of prisons and exchange of experience with German specialists of this field.

In the meeting with the ambassador of Italy, Mr. Foresti, discussed further cooperation between the two ministries in the field of justice. Mr. Foresti stressed the readiness of the Italian Government to help Albanian judiciary. A fund for the School of Magistrature soon will help train specialists for a democratic rule of law.

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**Bulgaria: OSD Leaders Propose 'Political Debate'**

*AU0808100596 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 Aug 96 p 2*

[Article by Valeriya Veleva]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] is proposing to the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council to hold a political debate on how Bulgaria can emerge from the crisis.

Last night, Andrey Raychev, Andrey Bundzhulov, Dimitur Yonchev, Velislava Dureva and other OSD leaders voted to approve an official letter to the Executive Bureau of the BSP Supreme Council. The letter states: "Following the meeting of the OSD Political Council on 21 June, the debate on the essence of BSP policies is being supplanted by personal attacks." According to Andrey Bundzhulov, who, it is claimed, was targeted by Videnov for expulsion from the party, "the ball must be brought out onto the political field of play." The OSD suggests that the BSP Supreme Council members should study the OSD's premises in the autumn and, if they "deserve attention," arrange a debate.

Dimitur Yonchev confirmed the views already expressed by the OSD that if BSP policies were changed this "would help in the presidential elections." The Supreme Council has to take the responsibility for deciding whether to replace Videnov before the elections, Yonchev said. In the OSD's view, this is essential. Prof. Chavdar Kyuranov is reported to have been informed of the letter by telephone and to have lent his support. He is in Burgas at the moment with Rosen Karadimov. The OSD leaders assessed Videnov's letter to DUMA as an evasion of the political problems. The personal attacks made in the letter "do not help the political dialogue within the party," Yonchev stressed.

**Bulgaria: OSD's Bundzhulov Answers Videnov's Criticism**

*AU0808111296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 Aug 96 p 9*

[Interview with Andrey Bundzhulov, member of the Political Council of the Alliance for Social Democracy, OSD, by Rumyana Bratovanova; place and date not given: "Videnov Is Afraid of Reality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bratovanova] Mr. Bundzhulov, why did a single article you wrote provoke a bigger row within the party than when the Political Council of the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD] issued a call for a new policy and a new prime minister?

[Bundzhulov] This came as a surprise to me. I am trying to understand what Prime Minister Videnov's motives and arguments are in adopting what in my view is a vulnerable position, which he detailed in his letter to DUMA Chief Editor Stefan Prodev (on 6 August—editor's note). I cannot understand why the prime minister all of a sudden directly joins in a dialogue that he has avoided until now. Sober-minded DUMA readers should realize that the prime minister is not aiming at the real target and that the aims and means diverge. His aim is plain and simple: to hurt the two Andreys [Bundzhulov and Raychev]. However, the two of us are different people. One may speculate for populist purposes with the fact the Andrey Raychev runs a private business, but this does not apply in my case. In other words, the prime minister has confused the two people that his letter concerns.

[Bratovanova] How did the punctilious Videnov get into such a tangle?

[Bundzhulov] Behind the tangle of notions and interests, Videnov is afraid—afraid to see the real reasons for the state of the country's economy. Yet again, he is creating for himself his own world, full of blind faith and suspicion, illusions and scenarios.

[Bratovanova] It is naive to look only for psychological reasons....

[Bundzhulov] And yet, at the political level, however unlikely it may sound, he believes in himself. Look at the speculative use he made of the term "circle of friends," which he [illegible]self launched (on 27 January, during question [illegible] in parliament). Paradoxically, Videnov believes i[illegible]himself, he believes that he is the party, he carries the supreme responsibility, and so on.

I would like to address him in purely human terms and ask him to pull himself together. His conceptions of reality are profoundly wrong; he should look around and see the true reasons for the crisis. I admit that he and his government are not solely responsible for it. The situation in the party and the country at large is indeed complex, but his reactions, including his letter to DUMA, are simply inadequate. People stop me in the street and ask me: Why are you splitting the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]? How can I put it over to them that neither the OSD nor "we two Andreys" can split the BSP. What might split the BSP are the government's inadequate policies, not the enemies "from within."

[Bratovanova] Did the media not provoke the row?

[Bundzhulov] I am not inclined to blame the media. We in the BSP have ourselves created this scandal, our intolerance of others' views. No "scenarios" exist of

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the sort that Zhan imagines. The scandal is not in the media, the scandalous thing is that we cannot govern effectively.

[Bratovanova] Is this not a question of an internal Komsomol conflict—between two generations, between the intellectuals and the apparatchiks?

[Bundzhulov] I would very much like you to believe me that this is not the issue. I have never divided people into party men and Komsomol members; even when I was leader of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, what I regarded as important were people's intellectual capabilities and moral qualities. Your assertion that this is an internal Komosomol conflict is simply barking up the wrong tree.

[Bratovanova] What is the truth?

[Bundzhulov] I do not venture to claim that my thinking is correct, and they are wrong. We are all involved in the party. We all feel some nostalgia for the past, there is some automatism in our way of thinking, but we also attempt to introduce new things—this is true of every one of us. The question is whether we are losing our sense of reality. This situation is a repetition of what happened after 1989 [after the fall of the Zhivkov regime], but as Grandfather Marx said, the first time it happened it was a tragedy, now it is a farce.

[Bratovanova] What fate awaits you when you are summoned to be examined by the relevant party commission?

[Bundzhulov] Under the BSP Statute, it has no right to expel anyone from our organizations, and they would find this difficult to do. So far, the newspapers tell us that someone will try us. For us, it is important for the positions to be transparent, and I am ready to have a meeting and to take part in a debate. If this commission wants to reprimand us, I would remind them that this time is past. The best thing is for the BSP Supreme Council to discuss the issues that the OSD has raised in the autumn.

[Bratovanova] Since there are surprising similarities in the criticisms of the cabinet that the OSD and the young generation around Lilov have made, a suspicion exists that you may unite to overthrow Videnov.

[Bundzhulov] The coincidence in our assessments comes as no surprise to us, but they are dictated by different motives. My criticism of the cabinet is not based on the logic that we have superb documents, but the team members are confused. In my view, the errors concern the essence of the reform.

[Bratovanova] Yet you avoid contact with Lilov's supporters in a way that arouses suspicion....

[Bundzhulov] That is not true. A debate does exist—an open discussion in the public arena. However, we will not take any steps to overthrow anyone.

**Bulgaria: DUMA Prints Raychev Reply to Videnov Letter**

*AU0908112796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 9 Aug 96 p 5*

["Letter to the Editor" by Andrey Raychev, member of the Political Council of the Alliance for Social Democracy, OSD, and a founder of the SEGA weekly]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear [DUMA chief editor] Comrade Prodev:

I am grateful to DUMA for giving me the opportunity to explain my viewpoint to a broad spectrum of BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] members and sympathizers.

I do not know of a single Socialist who is not now alarmed by the state of the country and the party. After almost two years of government by the BSP, Bulgaria is facing severe trials, and worse lies ahead.

They talk about reform, but no reform caused the bread crisis. The reform did not ruin the banking system, and it did not cause a threefold devaluation of the lev, making monthly salaries equivalent to $50 and pensions worth $25. Furthermore, the present semiservile agreement with the IMF is not a consequence of the reform.

However, what is most worrying is not the crisis itself, but the way in which our government led by Zhan Videnov is reacting to it.

Look at the bread crisis. Videnov first denied for a long time that any problem existed, offering detailed justifications for his view. Finally, offering no explanations, he quietly replaced one minister with another who turned out to be even more unsuitable. He then publicly stated that no grain would be imported, but later proceeded to import grain, and in large quantities at that. Meanwhile, the "more unsuitable" minister remains Videnov's deputy.

Alas, how many such trials can the BSP's authority withstand in the eyes of the people?

To add to this, we have Nachev's year-long term in charge of the Interior Ministry, with all its flaws. For Nachev to be replaced, we had to wait for the live television transmission of a shameful spectacle.

Accordingly, it is exceptionally important to discuss all this from different viewpoints as convincingly, intelligently, and, most importantly, as specifically as possible. No further ambiguity is possible if the BSP wants to remain a factor in politics.

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The "new policy" that the OSD proposes is one possible set of answers to some of these issues. It is possible that other solutions may be more correct than ours, but in any event we must hold a genuine, wide-ranging, and serious debate within the BSP. The end result of this debate should be that we succeed in defining our identity and obtain an answer to the question of who, in the final analysis, we really are—we, the former Communists in whom the people freely voted to give such great trust and such great forgiveness.

When we came out with a public statement about all this a week ago, many comrades, people in whom I have sincere faith and whom I respect as politicians, said: Not now, not before the presidential elections, let us win the elections first.

However, my view is precisely the opposite. My reasons are first, because the people see that we are in confusion, that we are with a great effort pretending to be lively and alert, while in actual fact we have no idea where we are going. Second, because the BSP has always profited when it renewed itself. On more than one or two occasions during these last seven years, we have taken resolute and risky steps forward, and not once did the people fail to understand us. Conversely, we have paid and are paying dearly for every muddle that we have made and for every insincerity within the party and ourselves.

I consider that Zhan Videnov bears direct personal responsibility for all this and many other things besides, and for this reason have allowed myself to criticize him directly and in public, calling for his withdrawal from the leading posts in the party and the state. Of course, this is primarily a matter for the BSP Supreme Council and Parliamentary Group, but I do not see any grounds to believe that a man who has failed to cope with governing the country in a comparatively favorable situation will cope in the conditions of a reform, and a difficult one at that.

Incidentally (and unfortunately), the issue of Zhan Videnov is not the most complex and important question that our party faces. There is a whole series of problems on which diametrically opposing views exist within the BSP. The most serious thing is that due to these contradictions the problems are now being passed over in silence and evaded. Here are a few examples:

To join NATO or what? Social democracy or what? Capitalism or what? A national middle class or what? Private ownership of farm land or what? The sale of big industrial companies or what? The participation of big international capital in Bulgaria or what?

I do not think that we can much longer avoid giving clear, definitive answers to these questions, questions that are so important for our future and even so terrible that they might even split us. However, one thing is certain: Bulgaria cannot run away from them. In every case, the country will answer them, solve the dilemmas, and choose.

Last of all, just consider this: If tomorrow the BSP forms a new, more competent government, will the people think any the worse of us for it? Will fewer people vote for the Pirinski-Marazov team? No, of course not, the opposite may even happen.

In conclusion, a word about myself. I am glad that Zhan Videnov is not receiving any support for his personal attacks on me. This convinces me yet again that the argument is about politics, about political issues of enormous importance for the BSP.

Andrey Raychev, BSP member,

Triaditsa Municipality, Sofia

**Bulgaria: Article Views Prospects for Split in BSP**

*AU0808142696 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 8-14 Aug 96 No 31, pp 17-18*

[Article by Teodora Encehva: "The Minority Inside the Majority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This autumn all that may remain of the supremacy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will be the smile on the face of Krasimir Premyanov [leader of the Democratic Left's parliamentary group]. The half-spoken whispers about the split are being articulated increasingly clearly, and it will be no surprise if the majority is seriously shaken in mid-September. The majority may turn into a minority. Some 10 or 12 deputies are threatening to leave the Parliamentary Group of the Democratic Left [PGDL] and register as a sixth parliamentary group.

The only big question that the renegades face is how to protest against Zhan Videnov's policies without committing hara-kiri. The Constitution protects their powers as National Assembly deputies, and is indifferent to whether they belong to the left or are outside it. The rest is a question of tactics rather than strategy.

"My colleagues have grown up," one of those set on the struggle admitted. He knows that their first adversary will be Krasimir Premyanov. The omnipresent PGDL leader has already caught a whiff of the plot.

**The Risks of the Profession**

On the last working day of the summer session of the 37th National Assembly, Premyanov's sixth sense

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started working overtime. Only hours before the vacation, he wrote in his report on the left's work during the year: "We are not infrequently witnesses of quiet, clandestine, but intensive struggles that undermine the legislative work and the singleness of the direction of our political work." In his report, Premyanov mentioned no names, but by the way he behaved he hinted that he knows what is stirring in the heads of the deputies in his trust. More than once he has had to deal with murmurings in the left's ranks. However, the new situation is not a run-of-the-mill revolt, and in his colleagues' opinion, this time Premyanov has good reason to be afraid. The danger comes from the fact that the initiators of the discontent are not identified. One story ascribes the ideas of a split to the combined efforts of Lilov and Lukanov. The two big boys have long been regarded to be just as deeply guilty as Videnov, but the cases are different.

If, during the first days of September, the internal party rangefinders fail to intercept the enemy, Premyanov is lost. The group of renegades like this idea. They know that as soon as Krasi's desk shakes, Videnov comes rushing like a fireman to the parliamentary group. At a moment like this, the prime minister becomes an easy prey for his critics.

At the end of parliament's summer session, Premyanov started to model the enemy's likeness. He noted "centrifugal forces within the group that are growing in strength," as well as "a lack of unity of action that erodes the moral and psychological climate among the deputies." He also put to the vote an amendment to the regulations for the PGDL's work to gain an extra deputy chairman for the group who is responsible for party ethics. The red parliament deputies adjourned the question until the autumn, but Krasi succeeded in summoning the specter of the traitor in the party's consciousness. Three years ago, Aleksandur Tomov was the first to leave the old firm; he split the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] into two, formed the Civic Alliance for the Republic, then Democratic Alternative for the Republic, and is now putting himself forward as a presidential candidate. Now, Tomov is another word for failure. How can you creep out from under the wing of the party?

Is the BSP out of control? To keep Krasimir Premyanov in good form, Aleksandur Marinov described the government as harmful. On the basis of this argument, he submitted his resignation as deputy chairman of the PGDL. "Everyone may go their own way. I work for myself," he declared when he was dismissed as leader of the Sofia BSP organization. As an authoritative National Assembly deputy, he did not refuse meetings with Nikolay Vulkanov of Multigroup or with Andrey Lukanov. With Karlovich [Lukanov], he even talks on equal terms, as they are both rank-and-file National Assembly deputies.

Yuriy Borisov described the updating of the national budget as financial impotence. At this moment, the iron-willed chief of the Assembly's Economic Commission, Nikola Koychev, showed signs of emotion, and the BSP seemed to spin out of control. "Congratulations!" Koychev said as he shook Yuriy's hand, looking around him to see if Premyanov were standing anywhere nearby.

Nikolay Kamov took the ball from Yuriy. After Vasil Kalinov read the memorandum attacking the OSD, Kamov picked a quarrel with him and the PGDL leader simultaneously. "I have never before heard more Stalinistic theses," Kamov commented. He finally drew Premyanov's wrath upon himself when he suggested that the BSP Executive Bureau should not condemn the OSD in principle, but produce specific countertheses to the criticisms leveled against the government. Instead of doing this, the BSP Executive Bureau instructed the All-Party Control Commission to question Chavdar Kyuranov [OSD leader].

During such incidents, Videnov has usually maintained a restrained silence, but now he moved into action. First, he gave Premyanov the job of preparing countermeasures to prevent the Left splitting; then, in his letter to DUMA, he instructed DUMA to take a firm stand against the old and new traitors in the party. The originator of the term "Orion's group of friends" discovered a new group of friends around the SEGA weekly. Finally, he set off on his planned tour of the Bulgarian municipalities. His first stop was Premyanov's constituency of Varna.

"All this might not have even happened, or at least might not have assumed such grave forms, had the leadership listened more attentively to the voices that warned of danger. However, these voices were in the minority when the vote was taken." This was how Georgi Bliznashki summed up the BSP's failures in government in one of his articles.

**Videnov's Compact**

Although wounded, the prime minister has immersed himself in his strategic planning. He will attempt to conclude a compact with his own party for the government to remain in power for a further five months. If he crosses the Rubicon of the presidency with Georgi Pirinski, the BSP leader will take all of the power into his own hands. However, in addition to Zhelev's post, he has long had his eye on the SDS's last fortress—the judiciary. Videnov sees the BSP's capability of

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capturing the judicial system as the key to preventing the split in the parliamentary left. In five months, the present Supreme Judicial Council ends its term of office; this is the body that appoints the judges, prosecutors, and investigators in the Republic. Parliament appoints 11 of the council's 25 members. If the red majority remains undivided in five months, this will give it a golden chance of placing more of its own people in the higher echelons of the judiciary.

Thus, for the sake of the good of the party, the revolt may be postponed, if not until the changes are made in the Supreme Judicial Council, then at least until the presidential elections.

In the meantime, Premyanov will continue to smile.

**Bulgaria: Dogan Criticizes BSP, Forecasts Cabinet Fall**

*AU0808122896 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 8-14 Aug 96 No 31, pp 11-13*

[Interview with Ahmed Dogan, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) by Pepa Vitanova; place and date not given: "Ratio Between Politics and Business in Parliament is 20:80"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vitanova] Mr. Dogan, a few weeks ago you said there could be no presidential elections because a tide is coming which could sweep away the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. Are we to understand your words as a warning regarding upcoming parliamentary and extraparliamentary actions against the ruling majority?

[Dogan] The united opposition has ideas regarding the conduct of large-scale extraparliamentary measures. The limit of the people's patience has been reached. The climax of the crisis will occur when the central heating is switched on. The days until mid-September are the last deferment the government has. Now it is like the calm before the storm, but the thunder can already be heard. Two days ago, I had a meeting with Dr. Trenchev [Podkrepa Labor Confederation leade.]. He also forecasts that the dissatisfaction will reach its peak in the fall. We will support the protests. If the united opposition decides to do so, we could leave parliament together.

By September, attempts will be made within the framework of this parliament to find an internal alternative to this cabinet. The BSP has a chance to form a new cabinet. I hope that if Pirinski is not registered by the Central Election Commission as a presidential candidate, he would form a new cabinet. I even think that they took this alternative into consideration when they began their game. His name is already in circulation and he is gaining popularity, thus he could easily be accepted as a good prime minister. He is one of the most competent people in the BSP, he has a very good image, and is clear both regarding the causes of the crisis and the way out of it. I was surprised that Pirinski agreed to be a candidate for president; he simply is ready for the post of prime minister.

The BSP is probably already considering the broad coalition formula, something like Dimitur Popov's cabinet. They could very likely invite the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], the People's Union, the DPS, and the Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB] to join. As far as I know the game's rules, no one will agree, except perhaps the BBB. The only realistic solution is to utilize the time until September in order to rally the parliamentary political forces. Everything else will be evading the responsibility. This variant is still being considered.

The BSP's chance is in cooperation with the alliance for Social Democracy [OSD]. If the OSD does not show its colors and does not assume responsibility for resolving the crisis, which means to call the things as it sees them and assume a total risk, our society itself will sweep away the rulers, and at least for two mandate periods the BSP will be out of the political game. [passage omitted]

[Vitanova] Some people are saying that you are not attending the National Assembly sessions simply because you are busy with your private business.

[Dogan] What is wrong with that? In Bulgaria, the political functions are combined with business and diplomacy functions. Two years ago, I understood that if I did not commit myself to finding investments and developing my own business, I would find it more difficult to set the tone in the movement. [passage omitted]

Right now the ratio in our parliament between politics and business is 20:80. Some 20 percent are devoted to talking politics, and 80 percent to seeking investments and money for our economy. This is the language of our communications and this is the situation. Whoever does not like it should look for another job. [passage omitted]

[Vitanova] When will the time come for you to reveal the entire truth about the BSP?

[Dogan] When the cabinet falls. The BSP is promoting the thesis that there is no alternative to its rule. This is not true. There is an alternative—the united opposition. We are ready to rule. Until now everything was an exercise. Now we have a clear program and cadres. However let me be totally frank: Unfortunately, right now the opposition does not want to assume power, because whoever assumes power right now will not be

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able to do anything without financial assistance from the outside. The international financial institutions will not finance us to the degree we expected as long as the BSP is in power, regardless of the fact that the BSP is claiming the opposite.

We must have a clean table for the opposition to assume power. This does not mean that we must wait until the country collapses, but in any case, the BSP must bear the responsibility for its deeds until now and suffer the consequences. [passage omitted]

**Bulgaria: SDS's Dimitrov Closes Ranks With Kostov**

*AU0808122596 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8 Aug 96 p 9*

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, former prime minister and leader of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Sevda Dinovska; place and date not given: "Why Shouldn't I Speak Out If I Think I'm Right?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Dinovska] Mr. Dimitrov, have you any aspirations to be leader of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]?

[Dimitrov] No, Filip Dimitrov does not need to occupy posts. I have no aspirations to satisfy.

[Dinovska] However, judging from your recent media statements, you are in conflict with Ivan Kostov, Aleksandur Bozhkov, and other SDS leaders. This is surely no accident.

[Dimitrov] I have not clashed with anyone and do not think that Ivan Kostov and I hold opposing positions. The fact that some journalist is looking for something that does not exist merely indicates what his purposes are. In my recent statements to the media, I have merely developed the parts of a logical plan, and I keep to these views.

[Dinovska] What is this plan?

[Dimitrov] First, Petur Stoyanov's victory is absolutely essential if things are to start moving in Bulgaria. Second, to win convincingly, Petur Stoyanov will have to stress the positive strength of the SDS, not merely in the form of promises, but as clearly formulated intentions to govern. This naturally includes clear program intentions. It is time for us to give unmistakable signals that we are personally ready to form the next government, and this will happen when Ivan Kostov presents his shadow cabinet.

We also have to consolidate our forces at the local level. We need everyone, including the people who faithfully defended the SDS cause during the difficult year of 1990. If we are to open the coalition up to those who until recently were not with us, we must first open up to those who until now were on the sidelines....

[Dinovska] Consolidation in the name of power, is that it? How do you imagine the SDS waging this battle?

[Dimitrov] Winning the presidential elections is the start, not the end of the battle for power. If anyone thinks that after Petur Stoyanov's victory parliament will dissolve itself and call new elections, he thinks the moon is made of green cheese. When there is not any bread, protests are quite normal, and none of the present rulers can expect anything else.

Next, the newly elected president must, in my view, be very vigorous and decisive in his actions. In such a situation, it is normal for every institution that wants to help Bulgaria to use its authorized powers to the limit.

Finally, we come to our parliamentary group. I want it to observe iron disciple and be prepared to present a united front in defense of the SDS positions. This means every deputy should know that if he deviates from these positions he may be expelled. Conversely, if anyone keeps to his principles, he cannot trade them in return for someone's devotion based on short-term interests. This is the case in every European country, because the opposite demoralizes the local structures of the political force in question. Everyone must fight to increase the SDS's representation, and not fight over the reallocation of posts, as all the defectors did in 1991, 1992, and 1994. [passage omitted]

[Dinovska] Does it not bother you to always think yourself right?

[Dimitrov] If I do not think I am right, could you please explain to me why I should speak up at all? This is a debate. Everyone should expound his arguments when he believes they are most correct. Anything else is only self-indulgence—I defend some viewpoint, but I am not sure whether it is right. [passage omitted]

**Bulgaria: Pavlov Opposes Selling Off Defense Plants**

*AU0608104196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 6 Aug 96 p 3*

[Article by Irena Marinova and Vasil Lyutskanov: "'Dobrev' Report on Arms Complex Kept Secret From Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The report prepared by Nikolay Dobrev on the state of the military-industrial complex (MIC) is evidently being kept secret from the ministers, because the cabinet did not consider it at its meeting yesterday. The report was supposed to have been submitted to the National Assembly last week.

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The three-year moratorium on privatizing MIC expired on 23 July. Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov told TRUD yesterday that the moratorium is due to be extended, because the denationalization of the arms plants would endanger our national security. Pavlov noted that even in a NATO country such as Italy, the MIC is completely state-owned. Last May, however, seven companies from the MIC were unexpectedly included in the list of companies to be liquidated. One of the firms concerned was the Aviotekhnika Company in Plovdiv, without whose services the army will have to import target drones for the air defense missile troops and the air force. According to the "Dobrev" report, the arms companies have debts of 4.5 billion leva. Loss-making production divisions that can be easily converted to civilian production will be auctioned off, Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev stated recently. However, in the view of Interior Minister Lyubomir Dachev, it would be senseless to sell MIC facilities for pennies before they are stabilized. Ivan Pushkarov, Dachev's predecessor in the SDS cabinet, considers that the moratorium cannot be extended indefinitely because the arms plants are simply failing.

**Bulgaria: Two Private Firms Receive Arms Trade Licenses**

*AU0708104796 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 7 Aug 96 pp 11, 13*

[Report by Lyubomir Denov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A senior government official has reported that two private firms have received arms trading licenses. This is a new precedent in Bulgaria. Previously, only the state companies Kintex, Elmet Engineering, and Armimex were entitled to trade in arms. Last October, the cabinet revoked Teraton's license and temporarily withdrew Armimex's license. In March this year, the cabinet decided to permit private companies to engage in the arms trade, which is permitted under the Constitution.

The Interdepartmental Council for the Defense Industry under the Council of Ministers issued the full licenses to trade in special products. The two private firms have submitted all the necessary documents and paid the fee of 300,000 leva. The name of one of them is Gerakomers EOOD [sole-proprietorship with limited liability], registered in Sofia on 4 July 1994. Petur Kunaliev is the company's chief. The name of the second company is still being kept secret. The only thing known is that Ukrainians have a share in it. [passage omitted]

Experts consider that the admission of private companies into the arms business is the second step toward privatizing the Bulgarian defense industry. According to them, the moment that a military plant receives an order from a private company, it becomes dependent on that company. The first step toward privatization was the decision to allow private banks to grant loans to military plants.

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**Czech Republic: U.S. Law Will Not Affect Trade With Iran, Libya**

*AU0808140096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Aug 96 p 6*

[Article by "pp": "The Law Will Not Affect Czech Enterprises, Diplomat Believes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—A representative of the Czech Foreign Ministry said yesterday that the U.S. sanctions law would affect neither current trade nor the plans of domestic enterprises.

Karel Boruvka, deputy spokesman for this ministry, confirmed that the ministry is studying the U.S. law in detail, but, according to him, Czech trade with Iran and Libya, which the United States includes among the countries sponsoring world terrorism, is minimal. The U.S. law refers to foreign investment in oil and gas drilling in Iran or Libya in excess of $40 million.

He also said that reciprocal trade with Libya is currently negligible, while trade with Iran reached $66 million last year, with Czech exports totaling $58 million. Czech exports did not, moreover, go to the oil or gas industries.

**Czech Republic: Economics 'Experts' Accuse CSSD of Bias**

*AU0808145796 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 7 Aug 96 p 1*

[Article by Ivo Nejdl: "The CSSD Failed Again in the Field of Economics"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Representatives of the Czech Statistical Office described as unsubstantiated the accusations of bias and insufficient neutrality made by Jan Mladek, member of the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] Macroeconomic Commission. Leading domestic economists joined in the Statistical Office's reaction. The experts, including Czech Statistical Office representatives, agree that Jan Mladek, who is generally recognized as an expert macroeconomist, certainly was not led to this criticism by reasons of economics.

Mladek explained his claim by pointing out that the Czech Statistical Office changed its forecast downward to show worse economic results only after the elections. Nevertheless, the Czech Statistical Office stressed that it was unrealistic to reduce inflation by 1 percent this year as early as its April estimate, the statement from the Czech Statistical Office says. Specifically, the forecast only indicated a reduction of one-half point in comparison with 1995, and thus was less optimistic than the government expectations as well as most of the domestic and foreign estimates. The representatives of the Czech Statistical Office further pointed out that the 8.6 percent of April was a result of objective processing of the data available at the time. The subsequent increase of the inflation estimate to 9 percent was based on new figures from recent months, when food prices, particularly, rose faster and extensive price deregulation took place.

Komercni Banka Chief Economist Kamil Janacek fully agrees with the stand of the Czech Statistical Office and believes that Jan Mladek was not guided by economic motive. According to him, Jan Mladek is an expert economist, who would not make such a "wild statement." [passage omitted]

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**Slovakia: MLHZP Faults U.S. NATO Bill**

*AU0808172696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 8 Aug 96 p 2*

[TASR report: "The Voice of Hungarian Reason"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Hungarian People's Movement for Conciliation and Prosperity (MLHZP) has received with regret the report on the decision by the U.S. House of Representatives to provide financial assistance to only three Central European countries, excluding Slovakia, for their preparations for admission into NATO. This statement was made yesterday by MLHZP Chairman Gyorgy Gyimesi at a press briefing in Bratislava. The MLHZP welcomed the statement by G. Horn on support for Slovakia's endeavors to integrate into NATO and the EU. By his statement, he has contributed to alleviating the tense relations between Slovakia and Hungary that arose as a consequence of the Hungary and Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders conference in Budapest. The MLHZP is convinced that any attempt to withdraw Slovakia from the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty would damage the Slovak Republic's international position considerably and could lead to the destabilization of the situation in the Central European region.

**Slovakia: Investigator Throws Out Kovac 'Slander' Complaint**

*AU0908121196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Aug 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Juraj Handzo: "The Investigator Has Adjourned M. Kovac's Complaint"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The investigator from the Police Corps Municipal Office of Investigation in Bratislava adjourned on Monday [5 August] President Michal Kovac's complaint against Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. In his ruling on the adjournment, the investigator stated that there was no evidence that a crime had been committed.

President M. Kovac submitted the complaint against Prime Minister V. Meciar for abusing his authority as a public official, slander, and defaming the Republic and its representative to the District Prosecutor's Office in Bratislava 1 on 28 May. The prime minister was supposed to have committed these crimes on 24 May when, during his regular interview for the Slovensko 1 radio station, he said: "Later, we received reports that enabled me to draw several conclusions. First, the Slovak president knew that something was being planned regarding his son, but he did not take any measures against it. Second, the Slovak president thwarted and influenced the course of the investigation on the connections with other persons also suspected of having committed crimes. And third, now, when the Technopol case and the so-called kidnapping are being investigated—at the same time, there is evidence of a direct link between these cases—a man who, if he did not have presidential immunity, would, in all probability, be accused of being one of the culprits in this case, is making decisions on the Technopol case with regard to amnesty."

In explaining his ruling on the adjournment (we managed to obtain the text of the ruling at the Interior Ministry), the investigator says that V. Meciar, M. Kovac, and Slovak Radio editor Martin Dobos, who prepared the interview with the prime minister, were asked, for the purpose of the investigation into the complaint, to provide a statement. According to the investigator, in committing slander, the culprit has to know that the information he has made public is false. "If he thought that the information was correct, then this is a factual error that precludes the subjective aspect of the crime of slander. Dr. Meciar is convinced that his claims, broadcast on the aforementioned Slovak Radio program, are true," says the ruling. "The investigation has not confirmed that, by his statements... Dr. Vladimir Meciar deliberately gave false information, and his remarks were merely criticism of engineer Michal Kovac and, for this reason, could not have involved defamatory remarks." According to the ruling, V. Meciar thus has not complied with the facts consistent with the crime of slander or the crime of defaming the Republic and its representative. He did not even commit the crime of abusing the authority of a public official, because he was not executing the authority pertaining to him as Slovak prime minister by appearing on radio.

**Slovakia: Paper Criticizes SDL Meciar Guarantee Briefing**

*AU0808173096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 7 Aug 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Peter Janosik: "The Left-Wing Democrats Want a Return to the Parliamentary Conditions Prior to 1994"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The extraordinary press briefing called by the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] had augured an atmosphere of sensationalism, but there were no sensations. The promised copy of the declaration by Vladimir Meciar, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman and Slovak Republic prime minister, that no more privatization decisions would be made by National Property Fund bodies was, admittedly, given to the reporters present and published by our press yesterday; however, there was nothing in it that would contradict our law, nothing

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for which it would be possible to submit a complaint to the court.

SDL Deputy Chairman Lubomir Fogas also acknowledged this. According to him, this declaration is merely a manifestation of political will and not a binding legal document on whose basis it would be possible to bring about certain legal sanctions. The SDL, however, has used this document to induce political sanctions. These, obviously, will lead to the greater unapproachability of the party of our left-wing democrats as far as their accommodating stance toward the HZDS is concerned regarding the continuation of the political talks. Maybe the SDL could have been capable of greater patience, could have waited for the fall session of parliament, when a decision will be made on the next course of action in privatization, and could have hung on magnanimously for another four weeks. But... The SDL, after all, is closer to the opposition than the ruling coalition. The opposition, however, cannot forget that it solved the government crisis, that is, that it kept the Meciar government in its posts. The political battle has various twists and turns and so it should come as no surprise to us that the forestalling of the political crisis, made possible by the SDL's stance, is not regretted by its chairman Jozef Migas even now. According to him, it is only seldom possible to be in politics without scraping your nose. And, in our country, everyone has a scraped nose. Not everyone, however, always knows how to come to terms with this properly.

The most combative or most iron member of the SDL, evidently, remains Deputy Chairwoman Brigita Schmognerova. But, she too, when attempting to demonstrate the unreliability of privatization, got herself into difficulty when she asked a rhetorical question concerning whether privatization or the state's interest is more important and whether privatization or fulfilling the government program is more important. But, these are references to the same thing, to something that it is impossible to separate.

If someone has reservations against improvisation, he has certainly never played chess and does not know that the expected strategy for the game may last until it is over, but, equally so, only until the halfway stage. It is impossible to carry out something for four years without a certain flexibility. This is part of a strategy—it is also the same in chess—leading to eventual victory.

The members of the ruling coalition are convinced that it will be as the SDL imagines in September. Parliamentary democracy will be at the level that suited the SDL prior to 3 November 1994 and privatization will be of an economic-market, democratic, public, and controllable nature, which, allegedly, it is not at the moment. It will also be a means for improving output further, increasing employment, and developing social guarantees for citizens. Incidentally, the government's current strategy is already fulfilling this.

**Slovakia: HZDS on Privatization Policy, Talks With SDL**

*LD0808150596 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] We now present a report from the news conference by the [ruling] Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The main topics discussed there were privatization and the publication of the pledge given by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar that privatization would be suspended until the bodies of the National Property Fund [FNM—government's privatization agency] have been restructured. Editor Oto Goerner interviewed HZDS Deputy Chairman Augustin Marian Huska.

[Begin recording] [Goerner] Deputy Chairman, what is the HZDS's current position on privatization?

[Huska] First and foremost, I think that the government is obliged to implement its program. The government's program is about bringing transformation to a completion and, in this context, mainly about bringing privatization to a completion. The delay generated by a certain disharmony within the coalition in the first six months has considerably weakened the pace of recovery processes and deepened some speculative processes. We have to arrest this development, and speeding up privatization is therefore on the whole an objective course we had to pursue.

[Goerner] So, privatization should continue. What do you think in this context about the publication of Prime Minister Meciar's pledge that there will be no privatization decisions until the FNM has been reconstructed?

[Huska] I think that by making the document public, the representatives of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] in effect opted for gaining a tactical advantage. The point is that they omitted an essential piece of information, which is that the undertaking or the statement by the prime minister, as HZDS chairman, had been made under specific conditions, over whether we would be able to maintain the coalition [word indistinct] was looming. Because all political parties showed no interest in holding early elections, we had to seek a solution to ways of supporting the government—either by finding another party to join the coalition, which in this case was the SDL, or by gaining support for the minority government.

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After contemplating the issue for some time, the SDL opted for backing the minority government, and it was in this sense that Mr. Meciar made his promise. A different interpretation of this promise, which has been completely taken out of chronological and factual context, is unfair.

[Goerner] You have invited, or rather you have proposed, to the SDL to hold political negotiations. Has there been any response on the part of the SDL yet, despite the publication of the statement, and will you be willing to discuss the change of FNM bodies?

[Huska] I am confident that we will continue talks with the SDL and other political entities and that we shall be seeking a solution aimed at greater concord, and that this will (?broaden) as much as possible the scope of our interests. [end recording]

**Slovakia: Commentary Criticizes SDL's Political Conduct**

*AU0808135396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 7 Aug 96 p 4*

[Commentary by Juraj Hrabko: "The Mistakes of the Party of Swallows"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no doubt that the party of swallows regarded the publication of the written promise by V. Meciar to the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] as a key event. Its representatives think that, following this step, it will be "clear to everyone that V. Meciar's credibility has diminished and is in jeopardy." Issuing political guarantees and not fulfilling them, however, is one of Meciar's favorite games. The whole world already knows this and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman is only of interest because he always manages to win elections. The SDL also knows this, although its new chairman, obviously, had to acquire experience of it first hand. The SDL, which had repeatedly twittered about Meciar's HZDS that it is an extremist, populist, right-wing movement, had no scruples at all about accepting a voluntary written promise from its chairman, and started dancing in celebration of its victory.

V. Meciar has already signed all sorts of things: from the signature on whose basis he obtained the sobriquet of Doctor to the promise to his daughter that he would resign from politics following his second dismissal as prime minister. He is simply a politician who uses every opportunity to increase his power, while it is generally known that, without the slightest qualm, he can promise the impossible and miracles within three days while you wait.

The SDL made several mistakes in this context. First: It is not "a man is as good as his word" that applies here, as J. Migas claims, but "a man is as good as his deeds." Second: During the coalition squabbles, the SDL bet on a bad card. The right situation for implementing changes in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] was on 19 June, when the Slovak National Party and the Association of Workers of Slovakia were willing to rectify their voting of November 1994. It was the SDL that, the next day, convened an unscheduled meeting of the parliamentary parties. It was L. Fogas who proposed a secret ballot in the expansion of the OKO [special supervisory body overseeing the activities of the secret service] and it was R. Fico who proposed postponing the restructuring of the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium. Third: Not even the SDL intends to conduct privatization in a controlled and public manner. It is not interested in changing the system, but the personnel. The privatization carried out by the FNM is under the control of a few political parties, and not the NR SR. In other words, until the decisionmaking on privatization is returned to the jurisdiction of the government—where, according to the Constitution, it belongs—which answers to the NR SR for its conduct, it will be merely party privatization.

V. Meciar did not violate any legal regulation in this case. The question is whether it is more important to observe the law or political deals. If the SDL had not applied the brakes to the implementation of changes in the NR SR and if these changes had been made in harmony with the Constitution, the rules of procedure, and other laws, it would be impossible to object to anything. It decided to act independently and is now isolated. Its credibility, however, as opposed to that of V. Meciar, can still continue to decline.

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**Hungary: Talks With Romania on Treaty To Resume in Sep**

*AU0808191996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 8 Aug 96 p 3*

[Correspondent's report: "There Will Be No Signing in August"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are no real chances of formulating the final text of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty this month—a Foreign Affairs experts told NEPSZABADSAG. We learned that the various tasks of the main protagonists of the experts' negotiations, tasks abroad and connected with the milecenntenial celebrations, make it impossible to resume negotiations in August.

Our source reminded us that, according to the evaluation of both sides, 95 percent of the text is ready. The sides have not yet succeeded in coming to an agreement on the remaining 5 percent. The Hungarian side also endeavors to have a new experts' meeting soon, but this can only take place in September at the earliest. Therefore, Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's optimism is not founded. As we reported earlier, in an interview, Teodor Melescanu mentioned the month of August as the timing of new talks.

Two Romanian proposals arrived, indeed, one expert confirmed to NEPSZABADSAG, and pointed out that, similarly to the practice so far, he cannot detail them this time either. Studying the proposals will take a few weeks more. Our sources said that they presume the proposals mentioned by Melescanu are actually one version of Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs's proposal on the minority rights submitted to Bucharest in July 1995. As we reported at the time, among other things, Laszlo Kovacs proposed that Proposal 1,201 of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe should appear in the main document, and not in a separate supplement, and not only as a noteworthy stipulation, but as a legal norm. So far, the Romanian statements have rejected the content of this proposal, rather than the formulation.

The proposal of "international nature" is most probably EU Minority High Commissioner Hans van der Stoel's package he presented to Budapest and Bucharest months ago, a package that was recently developed and published. This can also function as a basis for the negotiations, but the Hungarian side is also seeking a compromise because, without a compromise, the 5-percent dividing line would be insurmountable. There is strong international expectation and pressure to sign the basic treaty, not least among NATO political circles, our informer added.

We learned that the next round of negotiations will hardly be the last one. Both sides will have to approve the coordinated proposals at high level. According to expert opinions, the upcoming parliamentary and presidential election in Bucharest and the situation after the Hungarian-Hungarian summit in Budapest will determine the possibilities of progress in this matter.

**Hungary: Foreign Policy 'Mistakes' Seen**

*AU0908114996 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 8 Aug 96 p 3*

[Interview with Andras Kelemen, Foreign Ministry state secretary of the 1990-94 Antall government, by Peter G. Feher: "Half-Truths 'At Halftime'—Mistakes and Drift"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Leaders of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry consider its work during the past two year to be outstanding. Their assessment echoes announcements heard at the end of the eighties: our foreign policy is a success story. Even those who prepared this evaluation know that it is unfortunately untrue. Not just because in our region it is foolish to call foreign policy a success story, but especially because in recent years the Hungarian foreign policy leadership has often made mistakes. Furthermore, it is hardly possible to give an excellent report card to a Foreign Affairs Ministry that is struggling with the basic problems of functioning—financing is lacking for the necessary workforce, the number of missions is decreasing, diplomats are going to work at banks and insurance companies, and technical support falls far short of what would be required at the end of this millennium. It is not the diplomats who bear responsibility for this situation but rather the Hungarian Government, whose financial policy makes impossible the functioning of basic institutions, including the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which is of strategic national importance to all Hungarians everywhere. During the past two years, Hungary's foreign policy has been at the mercy of midlevel economists, who for the sake of perhaps saving a few dollars are trampling on our national interests, as well as on the internationally accepted rules of diplomacy. We asked Andras Kelemen, a foreign affairs political state secretary in the previous cabinet, to assess in terms of foreign policy the government document entitled "At Halftime."*

[Feher] It appears that the self-congratulation conceals serious problems regarding the activities of Hungarian diplomacy. Which of the problems can be considered significant?

[Kelemen] Hungarian foreign policy leaders are primarily proud of their achievements in international relations. In the Foreign Affairs Ministry there are undoubtedly

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numerous well-trained diplomats who in recent years—already under the Antall and Boross governments—gained respect for Hungary. This was the goal of the first foreign affairs leadership when it announced its desire to assume in 1995 the annually rotating chairmanship of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), now called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We in fact succeeded in attaining this. There can be no doubt that Hungarian diplomacy was successful in satisfying the requirements set by the international organization, and thanks to the work of Hungarian diplomats, our chairmanship of the OSCE improved our country's diplomatic standing. The current Hungarian foreign affairs leadership is silent about the fact that in terms of our international goals, our OSCE activities suffered from a great loss of prestige. Contrary to plans, efforts failed to have Istvan Gyarmati elected general secretary of the OSCE as foreign affairs leaders had promised earlier. Hungarian diplomats are present at numerous international conflicts, but their role is diminished if an effective national stance is lacking. Our OSCE activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina can hardly be productive if we are unable to even open an embassy in Sarajevo. Our whole Balkan policy can be given bad marks simply because we do not have any diplomatic representation in Macedonia, the country which is at the clashing center of geopolitical power relations within the Balkans. On the other hand, the foreign affairs assessment fails to point with pride to the work of the Hungarian leader of the aid mission in Chechnya, although it could well afford to do this, because Sandor Meszaros was a skillful liaison between the Chechen insurgents and the Russian authorities.

[Feher] During the past two years, relations between our country and the Hungarians living in neighboring countries have also changed. What are the major milestones in these changes?

[Kelemen] In 1994, Hungarian foreign policy leaders broke in numerous ways with previous Hungarian efforts to give appropriate weight to the minority question in international organizations. This was related to the government's plan to free itself from representing the affairs of Hungarians beyond our borders. Trust between the Hungarian political parties beyond our borders and the Foreign Affairs Ministry was shaken. Improving this acute situation was the goal of the Hungarian-Hungarian conference, where Laszlo Kovacs and Csaba Tabajdi made promises to help the autonomy efforts of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries. In the coming months, we will see to what extent they keep their word.

[Feher] The Euroatlantic policy of the current government is also unclear. To what extent does this affect the process of Hungary's integration?

[Kelemen] The Hungarian Government very correctly gives special emphasis—following in this the lead of the Antall and Boross governments—to Euroatlantic integration. However, this was hardly as smooth and successful a process as was claimed by those who wrote the summary. Numerous politicians of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] elite regard the EU, and especially NATO, with hostility or ambivalence. Within the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], there is also a large camp that demands neutrality. All of this is related to a network of personal relations—based on the past 40 years—which can hardly have been considered fortunate in Brussels. It would have been important for the new government to pay attention to the personal background of those they sent to important foreign missions. As we know, this happened differently... In terms of our relations with NATO, there appears to have been progress during the past three-quarters of a year. Our relations had been disturbed by the unthinking and unnecessary statements of some of our military leaders and the lack of understanding regarding civilian control, as well as by weapons purchases from the East. It is a fact, however, that Hungary was able to provide a secure place to the IFOR for its logistic and supply deployment. We can also be justly proud of the Hungarian military contingent that is active on the Sava. At the beginning of next year, Hungary has a good chance of being named one of the first countries to be admitted into NATO. For this, however, it is necessary to continue making personnel changes within the army, and the training of officers as well as our military strategy must be put on a new foundation.

[Feher] Before the elections, the current coalition tried to create the impression that if it came to power, it would be able to come to an agreement with our neighbors. All that has come of this is a strongly criticized basic treaty with Slovakia. What is your opinion about all of this?

[Kelemen] When it was in opposition, the currently ruling MSZP-SZDSZ coalition was sharply critical of the policy of the Antall and Boross government toward the neighboring countries. In the summer of 1994 they thought that they would be able to create a new situation by basing regional relations on the memories of proletarian internationalism. They prepared for a spectacular reconciliation. Gyula Horn imagined himself to be Chancellor Kohl, and in Meciar and Iliescu he saw Mitterand. However, not only is he far from resembling the dynamic chancellor, but the Slovak and Romanian presidents are also far from being like the late president of France. Even with international

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help the Horn government was barely able to force into existence the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty, which ever since then has been interpreted differently by the two sides, but with Romania it did not succeed in achieving even this much. Without a doubt, there is great Western pressure—primarily American—to have us sign a basic treaty with Romania. The rumor is that department heads in Washington are haranguing the Hungarian Government because they want to present the signed document of the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty to the international press as soon as possible. During the past two years, Hungarian diplomacy hardly said a word in Western diplomatic circles about what the exact issues are between Hungary and its neighbors. For example, I have never seen a document that explained in English the Hungarian Government's views on the Romanian education law or on the changing of administrative boundaries in Slovakia. They have plenty to explain to Western diplomats, especially to the Americans. To do this, it is of course necessary that our ambassadors refrain from saying, for example—as one did to the amazement of the audience while speaking at a university—that only half a million Hungarians live in Romania.

During the past two years, Hungarian foreign policy was unable to take the initiative on even one single occasion. Hungarian foreign policy is drifting—often without anyone to direct it—with the current that covers the whole East-Central European region. This is a traditional error of Hungarian diplomacy: floating on a forced course. Those who now direct Hungary's foreign affairs previously never represented, as a result of our country's historical situation, the interests of the independent Hungarian state. Our most extensive diplomatic experience is based on readings from the eighties, when it was progress if they just allowed us to drift. Since then, the world has changed. It would also have been possible to make the experiences of the previous government the basis of policy. We would have gladly expressed our opinions and explained the reasons behind our decisions, if our successors had asked. They did not do it.

**Hungary: Politicians Oppose Attempts To Curb Media Freedom**

*AU0808153596 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 7 Aug 96 pp 1, 4*

[Correspondent's report on interviews with KDNP, SZDSZ, and FIDESZ officials on alleged government plans to curb media freedom; place and date not given: "Is the Government Playing Ball?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we have already reported, the presidium of the boards of Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television, and Duna Television issued a common protest regarding the government decision of 24 July 1996; a decision on preparing the modification of the annual budget law, which curbs the independence of the media by increasing their financial dependence. The opposition parties have formed a similar opinion.

The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] said the government's law-violating methods represent a clear disregard of freedom of press. We asked Gyorgy Fekete, member of the KDNP cultural committee, whether the government's intention of drastic interference is clear-cut; although the government wants to modify a law that requires a two-thirds majority through a lower level regulation, it defends this step by claiming that it has only formulated "proposals."

[Fekete] It has never been easier to answer a question, because the text of the decision is clear-cut. The text in question reads: "After the approval of the budget law, the following things need to be carried out in the course of the changes that became necessary in the wake of certain laws and law modifications." Thus, the first part of this sentence brings up the possibility that the issue will be discussed by Parliament; the second half, however, says that the issue "must" be discussed and, thus, it actually orders the government parties to carry out the outlined modifications.

[Megyeri] The senior government party recently declared its determination to fully carry out the media law. In your view, is this a sign of yet another communication breakdown within the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]?

[Fekete] I am convinced that the aforementioned government decision equally surprised Gyorgy Janosi and other government party media experts. In the wake of all this, either Janosi and his colleagues or the government will have to go.

[Megyeri] In your view, how is it possible that they wanted to modify a media law in this was that was legislated with such a broad consensus?

[Fekete] This step is not special at all, in view of the several dozen legal violations and the half dozen serious violations of the Constitution. I am convinced that the government does not have any scruples in this respect either.

[Megyeri] You suspect that the nomination of the television head happened so suddenly after the long delays because some people somewhere signaled that the "financial and property regrouping" had already taken place within Hungarian Television, so now one can elect a chairman too. If this is really how it happened, could the anomalies emerge later?

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[Fekete] The first suspicious signs emerged when the government party deputies delayed the appointment of the parliamentary commissioner—something stipulated by the media law—through the ball game between the Cultural Committee and the Financial Committee. I am skeptical regarding the possibility of exposing these "property machinations" within this parliamentary cycle. You will have to ask the soon-to-be-established stock corporation.

We asked Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] Chairman Ivan Peto whether the junior coalition party regards the government decision as acceptable, a decision that urges parliamentary deputies to modify the media law by means of a budget law. We also asked Ivan Peto whether he was satisfied with the MSZP denial in which they distanced themselves from this document that bears the MSZP logo and which describes the advantages of eliminating the media advisory boards.

[Peto] Of course, we would find such government plans unacceptable—to change genuine parts of the media law in an indirect way. Parliament cannot adopt such a budget law; besides, such modification of the media law and of the advertisement norms are not acceptable to us in any way. We adopted the law on radio and television broadcast this way precisely because we regard this as the system of conditions for free radio and television. One cannot create conditions in which public service media are forced to take up commercial activity. We are not interested in knowing whether the document in question emerged at all, and when. Based on the position of the MSZP, it is clear that the idea of dismissing the advisory boards does not enjoy a majority, so the presumption has no weight whatsoever.

Tamas Deutsch, media expert of the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ], told us that efforts opposing the media law have again increased lately, efforts that can be clearly linked to certain government party groups. Tamas Deutsch thinks that the coming weeks will tell whether the efforts aimed at modifying the media law reach their target. Regarding the MSZP statement, Tamas Deutsch only added that he hopes that this affair will not have the same result as the vote against the constitutional concepts. He said it was a characteristic attitude of the MSZP that they repeatedly distanced themselves from their own decisions. The MSZP often brought up a drastic concept to only implement part of it later, after testing the reactions.

[In a related report, MAGYAR HIRLAP of 7 August says that SZDSZ leaders were shocked to learn that the State Property and Asset Management Corporation withdrew its advertisements from two national dailies—VILAGGAZDASAG and MAGYAR HIRLAP. In connection with this, SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto said that such a step was taken during the Antall cabinet. Ivan Peto finds this decision unfortunate and unjustified, because a state company should not punish the press in such a way; it should place its advertisements in the newspapers that guarantee the biggest economic profit.]

### Hungary: Air Force Officer Criticizes Lack of Funds for Training

*LD0808124496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a concern in Army circles that the Hungarian air defense system may no longer be able to function if no money is found for pilot training. Miklos Beregnyei reports:

[Beregnyei] About 20 percent of the Hungarian pilots are sitting in language schools and training courses in order to give an opportunity for the others to fly. Major General Istvan Bako, head of the aviation and air defense main division, told this program that they are getting only about half of the optimal operational costs. As a result of this, the lucky ones can fly for about 60 hours a year. This is exactly half as much as a NATO pilot spends in the air. Bako said that the capacity of air defense radars also had to be reduced. As a result of this, it is easier to get out of the range of air defense at a low altitude.

Bako added, however, that the air defense division should be the last to complain because they received urgent relief from the government in June, when reconnaissance had reached its limit. According to Bako, further austerity measures will become necessary in order to prevent the same from happening in November.

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**B-H: Muratovic Comments on Mostar, Elections, Brcko, IFOR**

*AU0808183196*

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1500 GMT on 8 August carries an approximately 50-minute interview with Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by an unidentified interviewer.

Asked to comment on his recent statement that war would not break out in Bosnia-Herzegovina again, Muratovic says that "many people in the world, including politicians, have been speculating about the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly after the withdrawal of the Implementation Force [IFOR]. They claim that clashes could resume if IFOR leaves. However, I do not think that the international community would allow the resumption of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina after such efforts to reach peace." He says that "one should also keep in mind the situation in Serbia and Croatia. Serbia has realized that after five years of war it has failed to change the borders of Slovenia, Croatia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina even by so much as an inch and that the world does not allow borders to be changed by force. That was the real reason for the war and therefore I do not think that there is any danger of renewed war."

The interviewer asks him whether he agrees that the military aspect of the Dayton agreement has been more successful than the civilian aspect and Muratovic says that he agrees entirely, adding that "just one unsolved problem remains and that is [the Sarajevo district of] Dobrinja, which IFOR is bound to solve. Still, the military part of the agreement was defined more precisely. Its implementation had clearly outlined procedures. With the civilian part of the agreement we have mostly declarations, which are not accompanied by any enforcement procedures on how to implement which part and that is why we have seen such problems."

Asked about the status of Brcko, he responds that "the arbitration commission held a meeting a few days ago. Our people working on the arbitration, from both this country and abroad, have been working nonstop, and I think that the arbitration should be finalized (?over the following months)." According to Muratovic, "it might be a good idea if the elections were not held there, since they could prejudice the situation, since the ethnic structure there has been completely changed. Obviously, the results of the elections would not reflect the situation that existed either just before the war or the situation that would be created if freedom of movement were to be made possible."

He then talks more about freedom of movement, saying that "this will be the greatest task facing IFOR in the coming period. Even the freedom of movement to and from Gorazde is worse now than it was during the initial period of the IFOR deployment. IFOR has not done anything about freedom of movement recently. It has left things at the stage achieved at the time it was separating the forces and during the transfer of territories. Without freedom of movement there can be no talk of any more serious implementation of the agreement in the future or the regulation of economic or other relations. I am sure that this will be one of IFOR's main tasks until New Year, and in its new mandate, if that happens at all."

Asked to assess the cooperation with IFOR and Carl Bildt's office, Muratovic says that "cooperation with IFOR is very good. We have no general problems. Occasionally we have problems as there are parts of IFOR that overstep their mandate and create problems on the ground with some of their activities, which are defined by local commanders. Recently, unfortunately, there has been a display of certain shortcomings that were typical of the UN Protection Force, for example, when troops from some countries start acting in line with their own policies, which had not been the case until recently. However, generally speaking, we have very good cooperation with IFOR."

As for Bildt's office, Muratovic says that "the people there do not have a clear strategy for their work, or perhaps we do not know what it is. I do not know, for example, what their next activities are supposed to be, what they will be concentrating on. I do not know how they plan to solve certain problems or what kind of an approach they plan to take toward some problems that we expect them to solve."

Asked whether the elections would be held on 14 September as planned, Muratovic says that he thinks that the elections will be held but "not even the minimum of conditions will be met for them to be fair and democratic. For example, the conditions for campaigning do not exist. Parties from this part of the Federation controlled by the legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, cannot campaign in the Serb entity or some of the territories in the Federation. The same goes for parties from those parts." He says that "another major problem is conducting the elections abroad, where there are a large number of people. The preparations have not been carried out properly. The deadline for the registration has been extended twice, but that makes no difference. The organization is such that not all the voters will get ballot papers."

He is then asked whether he expects the United States to keep working on removing Karadzic, "who is still in

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Pale." Muratovic says that "the United States has never stopped working on that, but it is not just a question of Karadzic and Mladic. The international public has only concentrated on them. Unfortunately, there are a great number of indicted war criminals and they all influence the situation in the Serb entity, just as those in the Federation do who have still not been arrested and extradited."

Asked about the agreement recently reached on the joint Mostar administration, Muratovic says that "Mostar is not as important as it is being made out to be. The more important issue is how Herzeg-Bosnia will be eliminated, how it will be stopped from functioning. Mostar is just a reflection of the overall policy in Herzeg-Bosnia and the desperate struggle not to hand over power to anybody else. Mostar was just the first case in which the illegal authorities in Herzeg-Bosnia were supposed to hand over power to elected people. I personally do not agree, I did not agree, that negotiations should be held and I do not agree with the results of the negotiations in Mostar. It is a step toward the temporary calming of the situation, but it is not a solution at all." He says that "the Croatian side is setting new huge demands to dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia. They are trying to equate Herzeg-Bosnia with the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today they appeared with certain demands and I do not want to spoil the day for our listeners with them. Negotiations are under way and we have made a plan of activities aimed at dissolving Herzeg-Bosnia. However, there are huge demands aimed at the dissolution of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Muratovic then answers several questions about social issues.

The interviewer again turns to political issues and asks Muratovic when the agreement on the use of the port of Ploce reached with Croatia can be expected to be implemented. Muratovic says that "the problem with the port of Ploce is in the transport, in the railroad. We still do not have an agreement with Herzeg-Bosnia to pass through freely along that rail line. You know that Herzeg-Bosnia has its own rail company. We cannot even pass from Zenica to Maglaj and Zavidovici because they do not allow us to pass through the municipality that they hold." He says "this is a political and economic problem. Herzeg-Bosnia and that mafia in Mostar wants to check every truck and, if we have trains, then we will have containers that they will not be able to control and they will lose their vast profit. This is the economic reasoning behind the problem and the political aspect is just a screen."

Asked to comment on the recent visit by the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation to Belgrade and the agreements reached on trade, Muratovic says that "it is of great interest to us that trade—and significant trade at that—is established with Serbia. The Serbian Government has said that it is prepared to trade with us on the principle of delivery to places of order in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to transport goods from the place of sale, so all the problems with the Serb entity are thus avoided." He says that "we are furious with our entrepreneurs, as 90 percent of them seem only capable of going to Kiseljak and Busovaca and Herzegovina to buy the goods. They seem unable to get to Croatia, Hungary, Austria, or Germany to buy goods there, where the prices are more competitive. They are the ones keeping Herzeg-Bosnia alive. That is why we want to open ourselves up toward Serbia, too."

At the end, Muratovic is asked to comment on the talks between Milosevic and Tudjman in Athens on 7 August. He says that "these talks came very soon after the meeting between our delegation with the delegation of the new Yugoslavia. It is good to maintain contacts. It is good to normalize relations among all the states of the former Yugoslavia. We welcome every improvement in the relations between Croatia and Serbia. This will certainly contribute to the promotion of relations between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."

### B-H: Prlic, Croatia's Granic Speak on Federation Forum

*LD0808191796 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic is in Sarajevo, where he attended a session of the Forum of the Federation. John Kornblum, assistant U.S. secretary of state; Carl Bildt, UN civilian coordinator in Bosnia-Herzegovina; Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission; Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak, his deputy Ejup Ganic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic also attended the session.

Croatian Minister Mate Granic attended the forum session at the invitation of the U.S. side. This time, the Americans turned out to be good mediators. It is also interesting that the Croatian side did not have any major objections to the U.S. proposals. Furthermore, U.S. and Croatian views on the speedier implementation of the federation were largely identical.

[Begin Granic recording] I think that the atmosphere at the meeting was set by the tone of the U.S. side. The approach to the federation and the interests of both

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nations were balanced. Pressure on either side was ruled out, especially unilateral pressure. [end recording]

The process of transferring authority from Herzeg-Bosnia to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and of transferring state functions from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the federation will unfold concurrently. The process should be completed by 14 September and the Croatian side also proposed an agenda of activities.

[Begin Granic recording] We have just completed work on coordinating the text of the document—which will be announced today—whereby the transfer of all powers is carried out from the republic to the federation and from Herzeg-Bosnia to the federation on 1 September, that is, of the powers which are not in keeping with the constitution of the federation, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Dayton agreement. [sentence as heard] The coordination was completed this very minute. The agenda is being discussed at the moment. Minister Prlic is working on it. Work on this document will continue late into the night, but a framework declaration has been agreed upon. It contains all the important political issues. [end recording]

[Begin Prlic recording] It is important to say that we reached a balanced approach today regarding the implementation of the federation and the institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim and Herzeg-Bosnia institutions—in the language of the ordinary folk. We are just working on this balanced approach. As for individual responsibilities, I think the interests of the Croat people will be fully protected and that, at the same time, the interests of the Muslim Bosniak people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be threatened. [end recording]

The Forum of the Federation continued work and a statement for the public will be issued during the night.

### B-H: Silajdzic: Federation Does Not Exist

*AU0608132796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 96 p 5*

[Interview with Haris Silajdzic, leader of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Haris Halilovic in Munich; date not given: "Bosnia Is Being Further Divided"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Munich—The extreme ruling circles in our country's neighborhood are not giving up the division of Bosnia. With this fact, Haris Silajdzic, chairman of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, began his interview with OSLOBODJENJE. The second important fact to better understand the current political position of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the political scene at home and abroad is, according to the former prime minister, the nonexistence of the Federation.

[Halilovic] How do you assess the current political position of Bosnia-Herzegovina some 50 days away from the elections?

[Silajdzic] For the time being, unfortunately, I assess it as a division, and this is what we want to prevent. There must not be any division, because that would be the end of not only Bosnia, but also of our people, the peace and stability in the region. That what was not achieved militarily one is attempting to achieve by political means. The extreme circles in our neighboring countries are not giving up the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This must be clear to anyone who wishes well to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The division on the ground de facto exists. We have three administrations and three armies. The Federation does not exist. After the good results we achieved through negotiations and the favorable foundations laid in Washington and Vienna, the Federation has been reduced after several unproductive meetings to something that can be altered each moment. Consequently, the Federation does not exist, and it was supposed to be a nucleus that would hold together the entire Bosnia.

#### Paper and Reality

[Halilovic] What should be done to initiate the creation of such a nucleus?

[Silajdzic] First of all, we must pay attention to our outside borders. If there is a practical step that must be made, than that is one. The outside borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, rather than internal lines of separation ought to be enforced. The internal lines of separation entail a division between the two entities. We did not fight, suffer, and sustain losses to live in entities, but to live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is, for the time being the division that exists further, and it is a factual division on the ground, while the Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaged by Dayton remains a piece of paper, a state entitled to a chair in the United Nations. The discrepancy between the situation on the ground and that on paper leads to a conflict that will occur sooner or later in our attempts to resolve the situation. It cannot last forever, such as it is today. In order to resolve such a situation, the first practical step is to restore the outside borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Formally seen, we have problems because the Belgrade regime and its military force, the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], violated Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders, that is, it annulled the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We do have this type of problem, regardless of all the victims and everything else that happened. Our state border was violated and this problem should be settled, which is impossible to do without protecting

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the border in compliance with international standards. We demand that the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina be protected in the same way as the borders of all other European states are protected, following international standards. No more, no less. If this is achieved, then the elections will facilitate the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the return of refugees to their homes. If this fails to happen, then how can we expect the country's reintegration and reconstruction, or refugees to return to their homes? It is impossible to achieve that without securing and protecting the state borders.

**Conditions, Then Return**

[Halilovic] There have been many manipulations lately with the return of displaced Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens. Our government demands, from the governments of countries which host refugees, certain amounts of money for their return to Bosnia.

[Silajdzic] Today in Bosnia-Herzegovina we have 80 percent unemployment. This is a truth, and it ought to be told. We have social problems in Bosnia, and there will be many more. To bring people back to Bosnia who do not have a job or place to live creates new social problems. We in the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina believe that in contacts with the international community one should insist more on the creation of preconditions for the return of refugees, and work more to that end. One of the preconditions is to provide minimal accommodation facilities and job opportunities. That is, to enable only those people who can work to return; those who can return in advance of their families and find some accommodation and work. We cannot discuss people's return if there are no preconditions. What will a young man do in Bosnia-Herzegovina if he is jobless? The return ought to be gradual, by stages, given the fulfillment of preconditions. I am sure that is also in the interest of host countries: Germany, Switzerland, Australia, the Scandinavian and other countries that took in our people.

[Halilovic] Despite that, one gets an impression that our authorities are bargaining with the governments of those countries over their own people?

[Silajdzic] There must not be any bargaining over the displaced citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. No one is ready to give cash to get rid of our refugees, nor is that possible, according to the law. However, the host countries are ready to invest in their return, in the creation of precondition for it. The entire subject also has to do with those people's dignity. Our people who are refugees abroad lost everything they owned, in most cases. They lost everything save human dignity. That is what we must preserve. Consequently, there can be no bargaining. We want to create preconditions, rather than to engage ourselves in bargains of any kind. As far as I know, those countries are ready to accept that.

**Once in a Thousand Years**

[Halilovic] You often emphasize that the return will be a slow process.

[Silajdzic] That is true, the return will indeed be a slow and difficult process. There is no speedy return, en masse. Who ever insists on it does not wish well to those people. There is no such thing. This is something that happens to a country once in a thousand years, and it is not resolved so quickly. We must be patient, but also to head for that goal. Unfortunately, since the signing of the Dayton accords, very little has been done in that regard.

[Halilovic] Why?

[Silajdzic] No one wants to invest in a country where there is no political security. There is no security of investment in a country where generals take part in politics. This simply does not go. Today in Europe generals cannot take part in politics. The army's honorable task is to defend its state, but the army is controlled by civilian authorities. In our country these things got mixed up, and people do not know whether we are a legal state or not, what will happen with their investments, and so on.

[Halilovic] You are talking about reconstruction, foreign investments?

[Silajdzic] Without foreign investments we do not have an engine that would drive our economy forward. There is no production without that engine, and without production there is nothing. This engine cannot exist without a legal state. The law must be above everything else. Reliable laws will attract capital. There is no other way. This is a clear, proven fact accepted worldwide, and there is no need for us to invent new things when everything is clear. We want to be a normal state, a state for normal people with a minimum of justice. [sentence as published] I must point out one thing that is frequently forgotten; I have to say this for the sake of hundreds of thousands of our refugees: A great injustice was done to our people. In their opinion, Bosnia has had enough of force. Anyone who becomes overbearing is removed by people. One must keep this in mind. Second, we simply have to start living like any other normal state. We have to have our army, police, and laws that will be respected by all of us.

As for the foreign political platform of our party, it supports involvement in the EU. We cannot be its members, for it is too early for that. But we can have the so-called associate membership status, obtained through some agreement with the EU. We must not remain

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outside global trends, and we must not remain on a margin of events in Europe, at its tail. That would again push us into great difficulties. As for security, we have to join the NATO, with the same status as that of other countries. Therefore it is necessary to harmonize our laws with European and world laws. That is impossible without a legal state. Rights and freedoms—these are not hollow words. This is particularly well known by those who suffered in the war.

Only if we have a state that has its borders, integrity, and sovereignty, we can speak about the reintegration, the return of refugees, the reconstruction of economy and of society, its educational and schooling systems, health care, and so forth. Considering the way things are going now, unfortunately, the situation is worsening. Bosnia-Herzegovina is in jeopardy. It is being divided by all sides, only now it is political means that are being used. We are often not aware of moves that are being made in that direction. Both inside and outside Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Halilovic] In much of Bosnia-Herzegovina those who do not wish well to either our country or our people are still in power.

[Silajdzic] With leaderships who encouraged killing and opening of concentration camps it is very unlikely that any serious talks can be started. Because of such people, the main task of the current political generation and each citizen individually is to preserve the legal and physical framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we fail to do that, we are dead. Both the Croats and the Serbs, and particularly the Bosniaks, who will be squeezed into a little territory, reduced to an insignificant factor in geographic, cultural, and political terms.

[Halilovic] How do you view the horrible genocide committed against the Muslims-Bosniaks?

[Silajdzic] It is no secret. There is a prejudiced attitude toward the Muslims in Europe. It is seen also in Bosnia. They want to nail us down and exhibit us on a small territory, which I call "greater Srebrenica." If they succeed in that, sooner or later, a similar thing will happen that we experienced before. That is, the disappearance of the Bosniaks-Muslims would inevitably follow as a result of their being compressed in a little territory, in between their enemies. In order to survive, the Muslims will have to imitate their enemies, which will not be tolerated by Europe.

**For a Free Society**

[Halilovic] You are speaking about possible consequences and how things should be. The situation in and around our country is not enviable at all.

[Silajdzic] For that reason we are taking action. We are demanding action from foreign factors, examining their moves. We are criticizing them, and placing ourselves between them and their attitude to Bosnia. We are not going to allow any division of Bosnia, and that is our task. In order for Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive as a whole, it needs to have the Bosniaks, the Croats, the Serbs, and others living in it. It needs each one of us. Members of this party and I will not take part in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are for a struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and everyone who wants to struggle for it is with us. Regardless of their following different ways leading toward the same goal and affiliation with different parties.

[Halilovic] Do you personally have enough strength to endure in that difficult struggle, the struggle for an integral and Bosnian Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] There were even worse times. We fought under much worse conditions. Just remember 1992 and 1993, Gorazde, Srebrenica, the program for survival [program za prezivljavanje].... After six years, only two days ago, I had a free day and a half. Our party gathers people who have proven that they have strength and that they know how to work. We were keeping in touch with the world, and getting projects and jobs to do abroad even during the war, when no one was able to get out of Sarajevo. We accomplished much more during the war, than now, in peace. I mean, from Dayton until today.

The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina wants free individuals, strong people, who will vote not because their jobs depend on that, but out of their conviction. We want to build a society in which each one of us will be working to a maximum, freely and openly.

**B-H: Muslims, Croats Fail To Agree on Herzeg-Bosnia**

*AU0808190796 Paris AFP in English 1848 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 8 (AFP)—Senior officials from Bosnia's Moslem-Croat federation failed to agree at a meeting Thursday on the dissolution of the breakaway Croat statelet in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia's Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said Thursday.

"We failed to reach the goal for which this meeting and all these action lately have been organised," Muratovic said, after the meeting wound down with no agreement on the self-styled Croat statelet on Herzeg-Bosnia, which should have dissolved into the Moslem-Croat federation under the Dayton accords.

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**B-H: Difficulties Reported at Croat-Muslim Talks**

*LD0808192096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1850 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug. 8 (TANJUG)—Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic of the Sarajevo Government said Thursday the session of the Muslim-Croat Federation forum was "very difficult" because the "Croat side made a series of new demands as a condition for the dissolving of Herzeg-Bosnia."

Muslim Radio Sarajevo said Muratovic gave the statement during a break in the session, which is attended also by U.S. envoy John Kornblum who arrived in Sarajevo on Thursday within his new Balkan tour.

Muratovic, however, did not elaborate on the new demands of the Croat side.

Meanwhile, Croat radio said Federation President Kresimir Zubak had accused Muslims of obstructing the functioning of the Federation at a press conference immediately prior to the forum session.

Zubak, a Croat, said the Muslim side was evidently obstructing the Federation's work since it passed a series of laws over the past period which are in violation to federal laws.

According to the Croat radio, Zubak proposed an integral plan for establishing federal institutions and transferring the authorities of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, formed at the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina formed by the Muslim government of Sarajevo, to the new Muslim-Croat Federation.

Zubak said the main reason for the delay in establishing the Federation was that Muslims were persevering in retaining as much authority as possible at the level of the Sarajevo-Based Muslim government.

Both the Croat and the Muslim side should transfer the authorities of their institutions to federal ones by Sept. 14, so that the joint Federation could operate as conceived under the Washington accords of early 1994 before the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina take place.

**B-H: Steiner Says Croat 'Mafia' Blocking Mostar Unification**

*AU0908112696 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Aug 96 p 2*

[Article by "pm" on interview with Michael Steiner, deputy high representative of the international community for Bosnia-Herzegovina; place and date not given: "Mafia Is Active in Mostar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Michael Steiner, deputy coordinator for the reconstruction of Bosnia, a mafia group among the Croats in Mostar is boycotting all steps toward the unification of the Herzegovinian city, which is divided between the Croats and Muslims. After the local elections, these "dark figures" placed the local Croat politicians under massive pressure not to recognize the election results, the German diplomat said in an interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG. The consensus, nevertheless reached at the very last minute, on the appointment of a joint mayor by the new City Council is a "success of the very clear line pursued by the international community, especially the EU," and, contrary to interpretations, is not a victory for the Croats, said Steiner. In this way, an important signal for the all-Bosnian elections on 14 September has been given: "Those who do not recognize the election results will not get through."

In western Mostar, the Croat part of the city, a criminal "parallel structure" has been formed by the Bosnian offshoot of President Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) alongside the political representation, said Steiner. He did not wish to speculate about any "character relationship" between politics and the criminal milieu. He said that this mafia is mainly concerned with financial interests that can best be implemented in the "semiegality" of the divided city that has no uniform administration and authority. The criminals, whose names Steiner did not wish to reveal, are "figures who are very spread out, also having links with Zagreb." Therefore, the power of this mafia can only be curbed by the Croatian leadership.

According to Steiner, the mafia is responsible for the attempt on the life of Hans Koschnick, the first EU administrator. The attacks on unpopular Croat politicians or the bomb attacks on cafes whose owners refused to pay protection money can also be attributed to it. "The degree of threat is fairly high here," said Steiner. This threat was also a decisive factor in the latest talks on the recognition of the local elections. Without massive backing from Zagreb, the local Croat politicians would not have dared sign the consensus paper. Their "panic" can also be perceive in the fact that as many as three members of the Croat delegation signed the agreement. Obviously, no single one of them wanted to assume sole responsibility, said Steiner.

According to Steiner, the government in Zagreb achieved consensus in Mostar under EU pressure "backed by the United States," otherwise Croatia would have been threatened with isolation in Europe. "Tudj-

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man is still watching very carefully how far he can go," says the diplomat, who is Carl Bildt's representative in Sarajevo. The EU, which also threatened to pull out of Mostar, did not "budge one millimeter from its core conditions, much to the Croats' surprise," says Steiner.

Even if the "playacting with all the various EU ultimatums did not appear particularly good," a major success has been achieved because, with the appointment of a common mayor, the Croats will accept the election result. The fact that the mayor is to be Croat was agreed far in advance. Steiner admitted that, naturally, there are still many possibilities to create an obstacle, also because the court that is meant to decide on the validity of the elections doe not even exist yet. However, his impression is that both sides now want a rapid clarification. He hopes for a decision within two months.

**B-H: Election Results Still Not Recognized by Mostar Croats**

*LD0808231296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1845 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug. 8 (TANJUG)—President Mile Puljic of the Croatian Democratic Community Party for Mostar told Sarajevo media on Thursday that the results of elections held in Mostar on June 30 would not be recognized until they were verified by the Muslim-Croat Federation's supreme court.

However, this court, as many other institutions of the paper federation formed in 1994, has not been established to this day.

Party representatives said the Mostar city council session scheduled for Aug. 14 would be "the first and the last" of this joint authority of the still divided town.

The session is to elect only the mayor and his deputy, while the next council session will be held only after the federal court rules on the regularity of the Mostar elections, Croat representatives have said.

Mostar Croats have denied the regularity of these elections, and analysts maintain this is because the Croat side does not want a Muslim-dominated city authority.

The international community, for its part, insists on respect of the election results, because failure to do so would jeopardize the Bosnian elections set for mid-September and the entire peace process.

The Muslim-Croat agreement signed in Mostar on Aug. 6 envisages that the forming of a joint city authority be postponed until a decision is adopted on the regularity of the local elections.

"The fate of Mostar has now been decided by the agreement and not the election results," party representatives have said, openly satisfied in their statements that the Croat side has managed to secure this.

Sarajevo analysts now speak about "maneuvers from the West Bank" and the catches in the "Mostar agreement," assessing that they might be preparations by the Croat side for repeating the elections in Mostar.

**B-H: Croats Demand Repeat of Mostar Elections in Sep**

*LD0908115496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 9 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Martin Garrod, special envoy of the EU administration in Mostar, confirmed at a news conference today that the Mostar City Council would hold a session on 14 August and that there would be no local elections in Mostar in September. This is Majda Ivkovic reporting from Mostar.

It is interesting that the City Council session was convened by Council President Hamdija Jahic, who was elected at a session which was not attended by Croat delegates. Mile Puljic, chairman of the Mostar Committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and vice president of the Mostar Municipal Council, explained that the Croat side had only received an invitation with a proposed agenda, about which it was not consulted. This violates the agreement on joint action. This is said in a letter which Vice President Puljic sent to Martin Garrod today. The Croats therefore propose to meet with the Bosniak side once again in order to resolve this by agreement.

Vice president Puljic had the following to say in response to the OSCE decision that there would be no local elections in Mostar:

[Begin Puljic recording] We regard the transitional statute, which stems from the Dayton agreement, as the law. The transitional statute states clearly that everything is temporary until the September elections. If there are no local elections in September, we will treat in the same way the provisions of the Dayton agreement on which the statute and Article 17 are based. [end recording]

If the Supreme Court fails to make a ruling on the HDZ complaint about the irregularity of a part of the June Mostar elections, the City Council will have to meet again in two months' time, in line with the transitional statute. The news that Zubak and Granic [as heard] have appointed the judges to the federation's supreme court—who need to be confirmed by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's Constitutional Assembly—reached Mostar this morning. Everyone hopes that this is a sign that the whole process in Mostar will be speeded up.

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**B-H: New Croat, Muslim Disagreements in Mostar**

*LD0908112296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1106 GMT 9 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 9 (TANJUG)—President of the Croatian Democratic Union Party for the divided city of Mostar said Friday that new problems would crop up in Croat-Muslim relations over who would convene the first session of the city council.

At the session, scheduled by the city's E.U. administration for Aug. 14, the city council is to elect the city mayor, who is to be a Croat, and his deputy, a Muslim.

Mostar Croats reject the request of the Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA) for the session to be convened by Muslim representative Hamdija Jahic, who was elected council chairman by the Muslim councilors at a session boycotted by Croats.

Mostar Croats, who initially disputed the results of the June 30 city elections, in which Muslims carried off a majority of votes, eventually gave in to international pressure and agreed to sign on Aug. 6 an agreement on unified city authorities.

**B-H: Italian, Bosnian Defense Officials Discuss Elections**

*LD0808190796 Rome RAI Tre Television Network in Italian 1700 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Italy's soldiers in Bosnia are working to guarantee regular conduct of the elections scheduled for 14 September. This deadline is extremely important for the young Bosnian republic, and was at the center of talks between Defense Under Secretary Senator Massimo Brutti and his Bosnian counterpart, Hasan Cengic.

[Begin Brutti recording] The deputy defense minister spoke of his concerns about conditions as elections approach. We must guarantee, soon, an army disciplined in the field of political rights and freedom of communication via the media. Furthermore, the deputy defense minister stressed that Bosnia-Herzegovina plans to have a European vocation, and so a special relationship with Italy. [end recording]

A new phase is beginning for our military mission: Italian soldiers will be responsible for supervising polling stations, the sites of which have already been decided. September's electoral appointment is the final chapter of the Dayton peace accords signed in December 1995. The withdrawal of the peacekeeping force is planned for the end of the year, but it is likely that the deadline will be extended.

**B-H: Bosnian Democratic Party Rejoins Electoral Race**

*AU0808114896 Sarajevo ONASA in English 7 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 7 (ONASA)—The Bosnian opposition Democratic Party (BDS), which has decided to abstain from participation in the Mostar elections, announced Wednesday it will again enter the election procedure.

According to BDS President Salahudin Mesanovic, the party will participate in the upcoming September 14 elections as support to the Bosnian Democratic Union.

**B-H: Government Protests Tudjman's Knin Speech**

*AU0808133796 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 96 p 3*

[Article by M.S.: "Tudjman Claims Jajce and Bihac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the speech delivered by Croatian President Tudjman on Monday in Knin, on the occasion of Knin's liberation anniversary, analysts feel that the following sentence is quite indicative: "Jajce, which was reverted in the past years by Croatian military forces under..."—Tudjman was at a loss for words here, then immediately continued—"...the sovereignty of the Croatian people, although not completely." Tudjman told Europe that Croatia was part of Europe even 14 centuries ago, when many European countries did not even exist. He told the Serbs that there is no place for them in Knin, and he also discussed the Croatian King Zvonimir's regal city of Knin, that is now "as pure as it was at Zvonimir's time." The entire celebration in Knin was imbued with the message that Knin is freed and cleansed of Serbs. Tudjman did not specifically refer to tense relations with our country and people, but his aspiration to revert his country to King Zvonimir's times was clearly seen. Thus he said that the then Croatian state "lost the regal towns of Jajce and Bihac to the Ottoman Turks' invasion." In the review of troops in Knin, units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] also took part, and they were referred to as "Croatian armed forces," which is a term that has been used since the Croatian Army and the HVO began publicly to take actions together.

Following this statement by Tudjman, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina forwarded a letter of protest to the government of the Republic of Croatia, demanding an explanation; it considers that Tudjman may have reflected some territorial aspirations of Croatia to the sovereign and independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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**B-H: HDZ Claims 'Ethnic Cleansing' Under Way in Sarajevo**

*AU0708131596 Sarajevo HRVATSKA RIJEC in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 96 p 12*

[Statement by the City Committee of the Sarajevo HDZ on 29 July: "SOS for the Salvation of the Croats in Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the inappropriate statements of some senior European officials and the improper pressures regarding the regularity of the local elections in Mostar, the City Committee of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] of Sarajevo issued the following statement:

We are appalled by the attitude and the behavior of the EU regarding the situation in Mostar and particularly by the inappropriate statements of some senior European officials. Much injustice has been inflicted on the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the latest arrogant blackmails and pressures regarding Mostar overcome the degree of allowed and normal behavior. We object strongly against the improper political discourse and the threatening, insulting, and unbecoming statements of Mr. M. Steiner [deputy head of the OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina] at the news conference on 28 July of this year regarding the situation in Mostar. How can one explain the following facts: In Sarajevo, the City Assembly was forcefully suspended and a one-national canton was illegally established and, in the reintegrated municipalities, plundering is taking place, other people's houses and flats are forcefully moved into, the population is intimidated, and the international public hardly takes any notice of that or comments on it. Before the eyes of the world, ethnic cleansing is being carried out in Sarajevo, but nobody takes any notice of that, nor of the request of 10,000 Croats who want to return to Sarajevo, to their flats and to their houses, but they are not allowed to do so. At the same time, the EU reacts promptly if anything happens in Mostar, particularly if they can harm the Croats. Double standards are constantly applied: One for the Croats and other for the Bosniaks. Instead of accusing the numerous recorded deceits, irregularities, and malversations related to the elections and voting in Mostar, after everything, the Croats are forced to accept all the deceits and injustice, to be silent, and to accept a subordinate position, "majorization," deprivation of their rights. Regarding that, even the Republic of Croatia is blackmailed, even President Franjo Tudjman is pressured. Artificial tension is constantly created about Mostar, only in order for the will of the Bosniaks to be enforced in Sarajevo, Bugojno, and other places without interruption.

Through its silence and unwillingness to intervene, the international community encourages the tendencies with which the Croats of Sarajevo and other places are deprived of their basic rights and forced to leave their centuries-old homes. The open sympathies of international factors and their taking of the side of only one people, the Bosniaks, results in the ethnic cleansing of Sarajevo and leaves the remaining Croats without any political influence in the capital of the federation. Instead of observing the federation as a whole and starting from Sarajevo in building the federation, because Sarajevo holds the key to everything, Mostar is artificially and intentionally pushed into the foreground. We also remind you that the advocation of the so-called civil Bosnia-Herzegovina is the biggest deceit, hypocrisy, and cynicism, because what is hidden behind it is classical "majorization" and lack of freedom for Croats.

The City Committee of the Sarajevo HDZ gives full support to the leadership of the HDZ of Mostar and to Mr. Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the protection of the Croats and of other peoples who live with them. We appeal to the Republic of Croatia and to President Franjo Tudjman not to give up in the face of the indecent and inconsiderate pressures of biased and impudent blackmailers, because if the Croats of Mostar are subordinated, if they lose their freedom, we will definitely disappear in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are also asking the international community not to allow the disappearance of the Croats from their centuries-old territory or to impose a subordinate position upon them. Take this appeal of ours very seriously, because this is an SOS call for the salvation of the Croats in Sarajevo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sarajevo, 29 July 1996

City Committee of the HDZ of Sarajevo

**B-H: OSCE 'Concern' Over Serb Statements on Sovereign State**

*AU0808170296 Paris AFP in English 1645 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 8 (AFP)—The organisation overseeing Bosnia's upcoming general elections voiced concern Thursday over statements by Serb officials claiming sovereignty for the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted "with mounting concern statements from the Republika Srpska arrogating to this entity the right to assert sovereignty as an independent state."

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The OSCE recalled in a statement the rules set by the Dayton accords and accepted by Serbs, Croats and Moslems, which stipulate that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska."

The elections, due on September 14, must lead to creation of common umbrella institutions—a parliament and a presidency—the OSCE statement said.

This must happen "with the participation of the elected Serb, Croat and Bosnian representatives," it said.

"All sides must continue to adhere to both the spirit and the letter of the General Framework Agreement," the organisation concluded.

Biljana Plavsic, acting president for the Republika Srpska, said last month that the September elections would "legalise the sovereignty" of the Serb entity.

**B-H: Plavsic Opposes 'Reintegration,' Approves of Elections**

*LD0808144396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1353 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bosanska] Gradiska, 8 Aug (SRNA)—The Dayton agreement is less than what we hoped for, but its big advantages for the Serb nation are that the state of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic has been given borders and a relatively high level of sovereignty, Biljana Plavsic, the vice president and acting Serb Republic president, said in Gradiska today.

"Serbs are the bosses of their territory," Plavsic said during a working visit to Gradiska municipality.

Mrs. Plavsic spoke about the current political and economic situation in the country before municipal officials, respected businessmen, and relatives of dead Serb soldiers.

According to her, the Dayton agreement must be a framework within which the Serb Republic will realize its interests.

"It is important for us to analyze the situation realistically and to take the most out of the given reality. The Dayton agreement must be implemented word by word, as it was written down and signed," Mrs. Plavsic said.

She explained that there are some problems in its implementation:

"Although the word reintegration is not mentioned anywhere in the Dayton agreement, it is obvious that the negotiators hope to do something along these lines. We must energetically oppose such an interpretation of the Dayton agreement."

Plavsic spoke in favor of democratic processes in the Serb Republic and of holding elections as soon as possible.

"We always used to say that elections had to be held when the war is over, but now we say the sooner they are held the better. We do not want war, we want to preserve this peace and improve our people's lot," the Serb Republic vice president said. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Plavsic Condemns Frowick Decision on OSCE Brcko Office**

*LD0808164696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gradiska, 8 Aug (SRNA)—Commenting on the decision made by Robert Frowick to remove responsibility for the OSCE Brcko office from the OSCE regional center in Banja Luka and give it to the OSCE office in Tuzla, Biljana Plavsic, Serb Republic vice president and acting president, said in Gradiska today that "those who want this want to create instability."

"All games regarding Brcko are irritating the Serb people, which is not good for anyone especially at a time when we are trying to cool down passions before the elections," she told SRNA.

Plavsic said that she will get in touch with Frowick and ask him to explain what is going on. She recalled that the Dayton agreement "states clearly that the town is not the subject of arbitration and that only the interentity line in the Brcko area is under dispute."

Asked whether she was briefed about the details of the Milosevic-Tudjman talks in Athens, Biljana Plavsic said:

"I hope that results will be positive, because the very fact that they had talks is positive. I believe that all of us deserve to see an end to this evil."

During her tour of Gradiska municipality, Plavsic visited the Mladen Stojanovic agricultural-industrial plant, where she was briefed about its work and production capabilities.

**B-H: OSCE Denies Transfer of Brcko to Centers in Federation**

*LD0808172896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1558 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Brcko, 8 Aug (SRNA)—Tomas Miljerina, head of the regional OSCE center in Banja Luka, told SRNA today that the OSCE has not decided to transfer Brcko from the authority of OSCE

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centers in the Serb Republic to those in the Croat-Muslim federation.

"The news about the alleged decision by Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Brcko should be transferred from the authority of the centers in Banja Luka and Doboj to those in Tuzla and Orazje is false and groundless," Miljerina said. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Buha, UN Official on Preventing Election Incidents**

*AU0808131096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1103 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 8 August (BETA)—Serb Republic Interior Minister Aleksa Buha held talks with Iqbal Riza, UN special envoy to Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Pale today.

Buha and Riza discussed the difficulties in the realization of the forthcoming September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prevention of possible incidents.

According to Buha, there is great danger of the voter manipulation, especially of those who will vote by post. Buha emphasized that, from a technical viewpoint, it would be extremely difficult to organize the voting of voters of one entity in the other entity, especially, if there is a greater number of voters who wish to vote in their 1991 places of abode.

"Provocations and incidents are possible. We will do everything to prevent them," Buha said and added that this problem would best be resolved by establishing the reciprocity principle.

"Both entities must guarantee the security of all these people," Buha concluded.

Upon the completion of the meeting with Riza, Buha received Roberts Owen, a member of the arbitration commission for Brcko. As it has been learned, the meeting is of a working character and is held behind closed doors, and no statement for the public will be issued after its completion.

**B-H: Buha Says Safety Guarantees Needed for Voters**

*LD0808170296 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Aleksa Buha, the foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with Iqbal Riza, the special envoy of the UN secretary general, on preparations for the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat entity. Zorica [surname indistinct] has a report:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Minister Buha warned against the danger of the manipulation of votes, especially of those arriving by post. It was also pointed out that it would be necessary to guarantee [safety] to people who wish to come from the Muslim-Croat Federation to vote in the Serb Republic, and vice versa. Minister Buha said the following on the results of today's talks:

[Buha] Looking for a formula which would ensure safety as much as possible, we finally reached a conclusion that we would have to call on the principle of reciprocity and then see to it that we guarantee mutual safety. The number of voters crossing from one side to the other should be relatively equal.

I hope that by 14 September we shall manage to organize ourselves, although Mr. Riza himself said that this was a short period of time and that it would pass quickly. This is an additional reason for us to be cautious. [passage omitted] [end recording]

**B-H: Serb Arbitrator for Disputed Town Fails To Show Up**

*AU0808193496 Paris AFP in English 1924 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 8 (AFP)—The first meeting to discuss the future status of the disputed Bosnian town of Brcko had to be cancelled when the Bosnian Serb representative failed to make an appearance, a spokesman from Bosnia's High Representative office said Thursday.

Colum Murphy said that the first step of an arbitration process designed to resolve the future of the key northeast Bosnian town had to be cancelled Wednesday because Serb arbitrator Vitomir Popovic did not turn up.

Murphy added that if it was established that Popovic had no good reason for not showing up, it would amount to a violation of the Dayton peace accords.

The former warring parties have not been able to reach agreement on the fate of the town which lies on the strategically important corridor linking east and western parts of Serb-held Bosnia.

During the Dayton negotiations in November 1995, it was decided that the area should be the subject of three-way arbitration by representatives of the Moslem-Croat federation, the Bosnian Serb Republic, and an international arbitrator.

The future of the town must be decided by December 14, one year after the signing of the Dayton accords.

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**B-H: 'Source' Says Belgrade Helping Banja Luka Secede From Pale**

*AU0808140896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our source claims that, for some time now, a group of serious politicians in Banja Luka have been trying to distance themselves from the Pale authorities, the so-called Serb Republic [RS], and annex Banja Luka to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The group is reportedly headed by Former RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, who was replaced by Karadzic in spite of international protests. Our source claims that, earlier this year, an unfortunately unsuccessful attempt was made on Karadzic's life, for which he immediately blamed Kasagic and proceeded to do everything to replace him.

According to our source, the Banja Luka group that wishes to secede from Pale and join the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is headed by Nikola Koljevic, that is, he supervises its activities. Koljevic is probably looking for absolution for some of the crimes committed by his self-proclaimed government in Pale during the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. In answer to our question whether the Banja Luka group has Belgrade's support, we received a very diplomatic answer that says it all:

Banja Luka is too small to attempt something on its own. It must have someone's help, and it cannot expect Pale's help in this case. It is interesting to note that our source never mentioned the annexation of Banja Luka to the Federation, but rather the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**B-H: SDA: Serb Parties Still Advocating Integration Into FRY**

*AU0808201196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 8 Aug (BETA)—Ismet Grbo, spokesman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has said that the political parties in the Serb entity are still advocating the integration of the Serb Republic into the FRY.

"The regime in the Serb entity is constantly working on placing the Serb people into a ghetto, and unless this is prevented Bosnia-Herzegovina will be definitely partitioned," Grbo said at today's news conference, as reported by ONASA.

He said that the SDA would call all the political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina that support its integrity to analyze whether conditions for holding the elections exist. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Krajisnik: Free Movement Needed for Joint Bodies, Elections**

*LD0908085596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0753 GMT 9 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 9 Aug (SRNA)—The [Bosnian] Serb Republic wants to take part in the work of joint bodies [of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation] because, if we accepted the compromise of the Dayton agreement, then we want these bodies to be set up and to function, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, said in Pale last night.

"However, there are some preconditions for this," he warned after several hours of talks with Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Krajisnik stressed the importance of the venue where joint meetings will be held, especially now at the time "when freedom of movement has not been ensured yet and many people have been arrested, as for example Vukadin Kuzman and some other people."

"Bildt and the international community are working on the exchange and release of prisoners and on improving freedom of movement," Krajisnik said. He said he believes a way will be found to protect members of the joint bodies of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation.

"That issue should be solved in good time to avoid any tight deadlines and to make sure these bodies will work," said the Serb Republic assembly speaker, who is also candidate of the Serb Democratic Party for membership in the joint presidency of the Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Other issues were raised during the talks too. As always, Bildt was cooperative and expressed readiness to provide economic assistance to the Serb Republic, which is a great encouragement," Krajisnik said. He added: "I would like to express my satisfaction at the good cooperation with the international community and its usefulness for both entities, especially the Serb Republic.

"I hope we will resolve all difficulties concerning the elections, primarily those of the arrival of voters, especially because many of them will come to vote in the Serb Republic. Financial means are necessary for that and technical details must be worked out."

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**B-H: Karadzic Declines SDS Demands for His Candidacy**

*AU0808174896 (Clandestine) Krajina Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic and the Serb Democratic Party [SDS], decided not to become a candidate for the upcoming elections in spite of categorical demands by the party's main committee. [Passage indistinct] that Biljana Plavsic was nominated candidate for president of the Serb Republic for the upcoming elections, Dragoljub Mirjanic vice president of the Serb Republic, and Momcilo Krajisnik member of the Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic. Aleksa Buha heads the SDS deputy list for the Serb Republic National Assembly, while Slobodan Bijelic heads the list for the parliament of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic, says the statement.

**B-H: Daily Charges DPB Candidate With War Crimes**

*AU0908111196 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 96 p 8*

[Article by Djuro Kozar: "Monster Wants To Be a Deputy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The information that a large-scale criminal, Ljubisa Savic-Mauzer, was the main candidate on the list of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc [DPB] for the Peoples' Assembly of the Serb Republic surprised and also shocked many people. The butcher from Bijeljina who has, for four years, massacred, terrorized, and expelled the Bosniaks and Croats, instead of ending up in the only place for the likes of him—The Hague—now wants to be a member of the parliament. It will be seen in September who supports him and whether he can win a sufficient number of voters, however, his candidacy in itself in many ways devalues the efforts, the spirit, and the purpose of Dayton.

**The Monster's "Record"**

An ample dossier on Mauzer's crimes during the Serbian aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, based on authentic testimonies and delivered to the Hague tribunal, has been extended in the meantime, but, surprisingly, no indictment bill was filed against him. That is why he could appear on the list of candidates and why he can engage in the electoral campaign in the Serb entity. What could this cold-blooded murderer talk about? First, about the genocide that he carried out upon the non-Serbs in Bijeljina, Brcko, and other places.

On the basis of the information gathered and processed so far, it can be said that the military counterintelligence service primed Mauzer for the bloody showdown a long time before the aggression. As many witnesses claim, he boasted in Bijeljina that, as a reserve officer of the Yugoslav Army, he had completed a security course in Pancevo and was poised for "what was about to come."

He demonstrated his massacring skills in the Luka concentration camp in Brcko in spring 1992 when (according to the testimony of one witness) he organized a competition in the slaying of inmates. He said that he completed a slaying course in Pancevo. Mauzer reached the record of slaying 17 inmate Bosniaks in one minute. Even if he had not committed a single other crime, and he has long reserved himself a place in hell, he should answer for these 17 slain Bosniaks and receive the harshest of punishments. [passage omitted]

**B-H: Serb TV, Radio Roundtable Debate 'National Issue'**

*AU0808134396*

[FBIS Report] Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian at 1920 GMT on 6 August carries an approximately 90-minute roundtable discussion as part of the "Elections '96" special election programming.

Drago Vukovic, the host in the Pale studio, says that tonight's program is the first in a series of debates broadcast jointly by Serb Radio and Serb Television that will "focus on four groups of questions: the Serb Republic and national issue, economic issues with an emphasis on privatization and development, social problems, and the relationship toward the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, Croatia, and Serbia."

Cohost Milivoje Tutnjevic, Serb Radio editor in chief, takes over to greet the audience of Serb Radio and says that "representatives of political parties present in the studio tonight will discuss the Serb national issue and the Serb Republic." He apologizes for the 40-minute delay and attributes it to "frequent and unexpected power failures and power cuts."

He welcomes the guests in the Pale studio: Zlatko Lagundzija of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Rasema Magazinovic of the Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Nikola Poplasen of the Serbian Radical Party of the Serb republic; Petar Jovic Civic of the Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Dubravko Lovrenovic of the Croatian Peasants Party; Dragomir Grubac of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc; Simo Simic of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats; Dragutin Ilijic of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic; and Miodrag Zivanovic of the Social Liberal Party of the Serb Republic.

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Citing G.W.F. Hegel's thesis that nationality is a spiritual principle founded and materialized in the state, host Drago Vukovic says that "nationalities and nations that do not have their own state do not have a past or future and need not exist."

Zlatko Lagundzija starts explaining the position of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina on tonight's subject, saying that the national issue is a "stumbling block" that could lead to more conflicts. He does not believe the issue depends on the size of the territory a nation occupies, but says "it concerns human rights, democracy, economic prosperity, and quality of life."

According to Rasema Magazinovic, the Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina believes "the Dayton Accord did not do justice to any of the parties involved, just as the war did not make anyone in this country happy" and says that solving the national issue of just one nation is no solution.

Nikola Poplasen takes over and says that "the Serbs are one of the few civilized European nations that did not manage to define a national Serb state in the past 200 years." He adds that a favorable solution for the Serb national issue will "put an end to the bloodshed in the region," calling for the transformation of ethnic borders into state borders and unification with the Serbs in Montenegro and Serbia.

Petar Jovic says that the Civic Democratic Party believes the national issue is "a serious social problem that will not go away if it is ignored or solved by means of scathing attacks on national parties." He says that the problem arises if the national issue, national interests are identified with the state and that "no national interest can be defended or protected with crime, genocide, etc."

Dubravko Lovrenovic, representative of the Croatian Peasants Party, says that the Balkan nations "don't have a minute of democratic tradition" and goes on to correlate their political existence with religion. He believes it is too early to talk about the national issue of the Serbs or any other nation.

Dragomir Grubac contends that "the Serb national issue is also a question of democracy and state" arguing that the people have a right to self-determination and that "the Serb national issue for the Serbs in the Serb Republic is measured by the statehood of the Serb Republic." Talking about the goals of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc, he calls for the completion of the statehood of the Serb Republic within the framework of the Dayton Accord and for the unification of all Serbs in one state.

Simo Simic explains the views of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats and the United List of Bosnia-Herzegovina, subscribing to the opinion of Zlatko Lagundzija. He says that "the Bosnia-Herzegovina infrastructure was not built for one ethnic community" and adds that the solution to the Serb national issue lies within the solution to the national issue of the Croats and the Bosniaks. Simic is convinced that the three national parties in the region will not contribute to "national reconciliation" and "the happiness of ordinary people."

The representative of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic identifies the Serb national issue with the interest of the Serb nation. Dragutin Ilijic says that "the silver lining of the war is the fact that the three Bosnia-Herzegovina nations separated" and adds that "we must learn not to accuse the other nations for bad things in our own entity." He says that "we now live in a worse totalitarianism than ever" and stresses the need for more democracy and a law-governed state.

Miodrag Zivanovic says that this war proved the national issue cannot be solved through war, ghettoization, and an isolationist policy. The representative of the Social Liberal Party of the Serb republic accuses the Serb Republic authorities, as well as the media, of "reducing the numerous aspects of the national issue to the relationship between a nation and the state" and of insisting on a "false dilemma" of whether one advocates national or civic state. Zivanovic says that "every country is a national state" and that more constituent nations make it a multinational state. He agrees with Rasema Magazinovic that "the Dayton accord is a given framework" that must be fully respected.

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**Croatia: 'Reliable Sources': FBI in Banja Luka To Arrest Martic**

*AU0708141296 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Six FBI Agents in Banja Luka Lying in Wait for Martic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka—DNEVNI TELEGRAF has learned from reliable sources close to the office of High Representative Carl Bildt that six FBI agents accompanied by four Croatian translators arrived in Banja Luka under the pretext that they were investigators of the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

The sources claim that the U.S. agents' main assignment is to arrest Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

DNEVNI TELEGRAF sources also claim that the FBI agents and their Croatian translators are headquartered in the EU monitors' seat in Banja Luka.

**Croatia: Presidential Elections in '97 Discussed**

*AU0908093996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 7 Aug 96 p 3*

[Commentary by Branko Podgornik: "Will One or 10 Candidates Run Against President Tudjman?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] On 2 Aug 1997 it will be precisely five years since the elections in which Dr. Franjo Tudjman was (for the first time) elected President of the Republic. New presidential elections, as Dr. Ivic Pasalic, the president's adviser for internal policy, said in late July, could take place in June or July of next year.

It is possible to hold presidential elections even before that date, depending upon political estimates from Pantovcak [area of Zagreb where the presidential palace is located]. The presidential campaign could overlap with local elections in the territory of whole Croatia, as well as with the elections for the House of Counties of the National Assembly. On 7 February 1997, it will be four years since the first elections in the state of Croatia for municipal councils, city and county assemblies, and for the National Assembly House of Counties. Writs for all those elections can be issued altogether or individually, between October 1996 and July 1997.

**Gotovac Dissatisfied With "Wave of Candidates"**

As matters stand now, at least 10 candidates could compete for the highest position in the state. That is more than in 1992, when there were eight candidates running. There were Franjo Tudjman, Drazen Budisa, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Marko Veselica, Silvije Degen, Antun Vujic, Dobroslav Paraga, and Ivan Cesar.

According to the information published in various papers, apart from Franjo Tudjman and Vlado Gotovac, the following are suggested or mentioned as candidates: Stjepan Mesic, Ivan Supek, Zlatko Tomcic, Zdravko Tomac, Zdravko Mrsic, Zvonimir Separovic, Mladen Schwartz, and Vladimir Bebic. It is only about warming up for the presidential elections, and all the people mentioned will probably not run. However, if the warming up continues at such a pace, one can expect an inflation of presidential candidates.

A lot of opposing candidates will certainly be useful to the Republic's present president because it supports the widespread opinion that there is no adequate person in Croatia who could replace him. Last week, probably bearing that in mind, Vlado Gotovac expressed his dissatisfaction with a "wave of candidates," adding that he could give up competition for the chief of the state. The opposition circles explain his statement as silent pressure on opposition parties to explain themselves: will they agree to support only one candidate, or will they support more—or maybe it is about something else.

The opposition parties can appear in the presidential elections with one or more candidates, but they have not made a firm agreement about that yet. It seems that, because of the hidden discord among them, or by the force of inertia, the opinion that they should come up with more candidates will prevail.

Those who oppose the idea of numerous countercandidates claim that it would enable Dr. Franjo Tudjman to win in the first election round, and that therefore the opposition must support only one common candidate. However, there are more and more of those in the opposition who doubt that; they suggest that each of the three strongest opposing parties presents (its strongest) candidate in the first round of the elections, and in the second round that all opposing parties should support the candidate who won the largest number of votes. Therefore, in that opinion, the three main parties should be the Croatian Peasants Party [HSS], the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS], and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia [SDP].

**"Imposed" Common Candidate**

The supporters of that thesis claim that insisting on presenting only one opposing candidate would introduce discord among the opposition parties and their leaders from the very beginning. Namely, some parties and their voters could be dissatisfied with the "imposed" common candidate. It would be useful for the present president because some of the dissatisfied opposition supporters

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would vote for Franjo Tudjman, or boycott the elections. Therefore, the supporters of that proposal say that the opposing voters should pick the most credible horse for the finish of the race.

The selection of the most credible (not only opposing) candidate should be facilitated by the fact that a bigger and bigger part of Croatian public demands a turn in Croatian policy, its shift from a war to a peace track. It seems that those presidential candidates who will promise that they will not do what has been done so far will have the best chances. In other words, it is an assumption that those presidential candidates who want success are expected to have very similar programs of changes, and that the electorate itself will make its judgment about the person who is the most credible to carry those changes out.

One should have no illusions that any other (opposing) politician instead of the president would be any better. Ivica Racan [SDP] has a similar opinion, and he has recently said that he could imagine an even worse president than the present one. In his opinion, it is not the person who is the problem, but the powers this highest state duty brings. Recently, Racan has told a story about an interesting case that occurred a couple of years ago. Among the leaders of the opposing parties who had seats in the last National Assembly composition, one carried out an opinion survey in which they were supposed to say whether they supported a presidential or parliamentary system of authority. All of them said that they supported the parliamentary system. However, among numerous questions in that opinion survey, there was one supervisory question, which asked something like this: If you were to be elected president of the Republic, what would be your first move? The opposition leaders listed various moves, but for all of them one needed to have powers that the current president of the Republic has. Only one opposition leader said that his first move would be to change the Constitution and replace the (semi)presidential system with the parliamentary one.

As the leaders of the SDP claim the SDP can, but is not obliged to, point out its own presidential candidate, from the aforementioned one can probably conclude that some opposing circles are ready—in the first or second round of elections—to support the man from the opposition, but also the current president. If this is so, then it is almost sure that those circles would support the president under the condition that he started making constitutional changes by which the (semi)presidential system would be replaced by the parliamentary system. But that is unacceptable for a president.

**Who Can Be a Serious Candidate?**

One can be pretty sure and claim that a presidential countercandidate from the left will not be able to endanger Dr. Franjo Tudjman, because his voters are mostly conservative and largely oriented to the right. Serious competition can only come from someone from the center or the moderate right, who will also have the support on the left.

Whatever it is, it seems that the political program of the presidential candidates will be crucial. It is obvious that the cooperation of the opposition in the presidential elections and the choice of the most credible candidate will depend on whether they will succeed in reaching an agreement over the common program of changes in Croatia. If it will not be able to create a common national program, the opposition will appear with many party programs, as has been the case so far. In that case, the current president will be able to sleep tight, or tighter.

**Croatia: Commentary Analyzes Tudjman-Milosevic Talks**

*LD0908101296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[Commentary by Obrad Kosovac]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Today, just one day after the meeting between [Croatian] President Tudjman and [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic, we can say with a fair amount of certainty that the results of their talks in Athens were successful. Political observers expected something like this, in view of the fact that the Croatian leadership has said for a long time that there is no point in having a summit meeting unless it leads to recognition, or at least a final agreement on it. Mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, which the host of the meeting, [Greek] Prime Minister [Konstandinos] Simitis, announced explicitly, is the most important result of this meeting in view of the fact that it is only after this [mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations] that the establishment of full concrete relations between the two states can take place. This is also the topic of our commentary this evening:

[Kosovac] The agreement on final recognition means that Yugoslavia also formally recognizes those borders of Croatia which the international community recognized four and a half years ago. In practical terms this amounts to recognition of the defeat of Yugoslavia's expansionist policy conducted over the past few years. it also resolves in principle the two biggest disputes which burdened mutual relations after the end of the conflict.

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The joint statement which expresses support for consistent implementation of the Erdut Agreement [on eastern Slavonia] is further confirmation that the policy of the rebel Serbs in Croatia who sought unification with Yugoslavia has been defeated. The future recognition [of Croatia] will discourage them still further.

As far as Prevlaka is concerned—and Croatia sees nothing controversial about it—Milosevic again proposed an exchange of territories, according to well-informed sources and according to foreign correspondents. He allegedly again asked for territory in the southern part of Croatia in exchange for Dubrovnik's hinterland, thus as many times before underestimating the Croats and proving that he learned nothing from his earlier experiences.

In exchange for what he was asking from us, he offered something which already belongs to us, in response to which the Croatian president just chuckled. The question really is whether Milosevic meant it seriously, or whether he was again trying to impress his own public as a president who is trying to do something which, unfortunately for Yugoslavia, is not possible.

Political analysts tend to believe the second alternative. Otherwise, he would have offered something more attractive such as, for instance, parts of the Bosnian Posavina, although even then the reply would be doubtful.

Whatever the case, by offering an exchange [of territory], Milosevic quite explicitly recognizes Croatia's sovereignty of Prevlaka, which confirms the supposition that he is doing all of this just for domestic consumption and that, despite everything, he is not prepared to strain relations with Croatia forever.

The first bilateral talks at the highest level, which the Greeks first proposed at the end of 1993, resulted in a change of Yugoslavia's negotiating tactics. Given that the step-by-step tactics which defined Yugoslav attitude toward Croatia more than a year ago yielded no results, Milosevic decided to accelerate the whole process.

Whether mutual recognition is a matter of days or months it depends above all on whether Milosevic wants to step up internal or foreign-political promotion in the period ahead. [sentence as received] If he decides on internal promotion, recognition could be postponed for a short period because of the upcoming elections in Yugoslavia. If he decides on foreign-political promotion, recognition is truly a matter of days. Either way, Milosevic was forced to accept recognition, above all for economic reasons.

Croatia's interest in normalization is linked with all of this and with humanitarian questions. Equally, if not more important, is the fact that Croatian-Yugoslav relations are the fundamental factor of stability in this part of Europe, as can be seen from expressions of support for the [Athens] meeting and for its results, above all from the United States.

There will, of course, be reactions by malicious people who will interpret the meeting as a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this should be attributed either to limited understanding of complex political processes or to the political and foreign interests of those who are doing it.

### Croatia: Tudjman-Milosevic Talks in Athens Viewed

*AU0808162896 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 96 p 2*

[Commentary by Zeljko Kruselj: "The Burden of Prevlaka Is Being Removed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another slightly greater step has been taken in the process of solving the series of controversial issues between Croatia and the Serbian-Montenegrin federation. Although, thanks to Greek Prime Minister Simitis's initiative, the Athens talks between President Tudjman and President Milosevic occurred earlier than analysts had expected, this time the possibility of a "full normalization of relations" was openly announced, which gives a new quality to the negotiating process. From the Croatian point of view, this would mean that the long-awaited mutual diplomatic recognition is visible in the horizon and afterward all problems will be significantly simplified. Of course, it will still take much patience and expert work in order to reach mutual consent by the end of this month over an agreement to be initialled in Belgrade by the two ministers of foreign affairs. That would indeed be the introduction to the final ratification of the agreement.

The optimism arising from the Athens meeting is certainly also based upon the realization that some movement had first to be made on the issue of Prevlaka, which had, at least behind the scenes, been burdening all bilateral meetings so far. Having realized that Croatia will not give up this strategically important territory, Milosevic has agreed to negotiations in the spirit of the UN Charter and neighborly relations and without military threats, as Zagreb had been suggesting from the very outset.

The well known problem of the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes has also been analyzed in detail, but as long as the principles of the Zagreb-Erdut and the Dayton agreement are consistently respected, which is extremely important so as to rule

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out any kind of demands for "political autonomy" or other forms of violation of Croatian sovereignty. If the burning problem of the Croatian Danube basin is solved in this way, then the doors are open to all forms of economic cooperation, but only based on mutual interests.

**Croatia: UNHCR Urges Zagreb To Help Serb Refugees Return**

*AU0808184096 Paris AFP in English 1832 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 8 (AFP)—A day after Zagreb and Belgrade announced they are to normalise relations, Croatia has again been asked to help secure the return of tens of thousands of Serbs who fled a Croatian army offensive last year.

A UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesman said Thursday Zagreb had been urged "so far without success" to ensure the return of the up to 200,000 Serbs who fled during Operation Storm.

In the offensive, which began on August 4, 1995, the Croatian army recaptured in four days territory held by the Serbs for four years.

About 170,000 of the Serbs who fled are living in Serbia and Montenegro and about 30 percent are still living in collective centres, the UNHCR said.

"The UNHCR urges the Croatian government to create a safe environment for repatriation," UNHCR spokesman Marwan Elkhoury said here. "The return should be open, unconditional and minority rights should be fully guaranteed."

Saying that the Serbs' situation was "worsening," Elkhoury said that the UNHCR was "very concerned" about continuous harassment, looting and burning of Serb houses in the former Serb-held areas.

He called for the arrest of those involved and insisted that a general amnesty be adopted to reassure Serbs who feared facing war crimes charges.

"We call on the international community to insist that Croatia facilitates the repatriation of the refugees, to insist on the right of ethnic Serbs from the former (Serb-held) Krajina (region) to return to their homes in safety and security and their rights to be fully guaranteed by the Croatian authorities," he said.

On Wednesday, Elisabeth Rehn, the United Nations' special human rights envoy, said Zagreb was refusing permission to Serbs to return to look after aged parents.

Speaking in Podgorica, Montenegro, after a visit to Croatia, she condemned the renewed violence against the remaining Serbs in Croatia, many of whom are elderly, saying there at least three people have been killed recently.

"I have not been very happy with what has been happening to those Serbs who were left behind, old people, paralysed people in very bad conditions," she said.

Rehn said a solution must be found for the population of Krajina, and said she would continue her dialogue with the Croatian authorities.

The UN envoy was Thursday in the southern Bosnian city of Mostar where she met international officials, displaced people and local religious leaders.

She also expressed concern about the case of Milan Jovicic, a Serb and the oldest member of the Mostar city council.

Jovicic is currently living under EU protection in their headquarters in the city. He came there after being chased by what he describes as "terrorists."

Rehn said that Jovicic should be left alone.

"We have to swallow some things but there are some things we just cannot swallow and that's it," she told a press conference.

Rehn later left for Sarajevo. She is due to stay there through Saturday and on Sunday will go to Zagreb.

Croatia and rump Yugoslavia said Wednesday they would restore relations later this month.

Relations were broken off in 1991 when Croatia declared independence. Later that year, war broke out with rebel Croatian Serbs, backed by the former Yugoslav army, who captured over one quarter of Croatia's territory.

**Croatia: Stanimirovic Briefs EU Ambassadors on Slavonia**

*AU0908071696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the Executive Council of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, stated today, after talks with EU officials, that the guests said the Croatian amnesty law was very bad and that it will soon be changed.

According to the positions of the three ambassadors, who articulated the opinion of the EU, this law is politically harmful for Croatia, and is the reason it is exposed to a great deal of pressure from the international community, said Stanimirovic.

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The provincial prime minister also said that, in the talks with British Ambassador Gavin Hewitt, Dutch Ambassador Joszef Schefers, and Italian Ambassador Fulvio Paolini, the positions on elections and the activity of parties were coordinated.

If we want to have good elections, the activity of the parties must be intensified at least three months before the elections are held, said Dr. Stanimirovic, assessing the joint decision. He added that he presented to his guests the problem that there is no committee within UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] that would deal with election problems.

I also pointed out to the EU guests that Croatia's law on territorial organization is a breach of the Erdut Agreement, said Stanimirovic, reminding the guests that this document anticipates the existence of an association of Serb municipalities as a region in the territorial organization of Croatia.

Dr. Stanimirovic said that another joint decision was that the EU aid of about ECU7 million will come in handy in the revitalization of the infrastructure in the province, and thus contribute to the further implementation of the agreement, which, as was stated, has come to a halt.

**Croatia: Serb Official Receives Head of Vukovar EU Office**

*AU0908082696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 6 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the executive council of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, received the head of the EU regional office, (Jacques Luc Fourre), and his associates in Vukovar today.

We briefed the prime minister [as heard] on the operation of the regional EU office in Vukovar, said (Fourre). He told reporters that, apart from himself, the office staff includes two liaison officers for communication with the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia], two monitors, and a humanitarian affairs official.

The monitoring mission office in Dalj was closed on 1 August, and, according to (Fourre), the monitors from Dalj are now working in the Osijek and Vinkovci offices.

We intend to maintain our good contacts with your authorities, as well as to build trust between the Serb and Croat sides, said head of the regional office of the EU monitoring mission, (Jacques Fourre).

**Croatia: EU Invests 5 Million ECU's in Srem-Baranja**

*LD0708200496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1929 GMT 7 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Aug 7 (TANJUG)—President Goran Hadzic of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem said on Wednesday he was satisfied that about five million ECUs would be invested in this area as of Monday.

'With this E.U. investment, the people will finally see economic benefits of the United Nations mission,' Hadzic said in talks in Erdut with the Netherlands ambassador to Croatia Jozef Sefers.

Sefers heads a European commission delegation whose other members are British Ambassador Gavin Hewitt and E.C. Special Envoy Fulvio Palini. This is the second day of the delegation's visit to this part of the former Republic of Serb Krajina, the only part which the Croatian Army has not occupied.

Under the Erdut Agreement signed late last year by representatives of Croatian authorities and local Serbs, this region was placed under a one-year United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) with a possible one-year extension of its mandate.

After the talks with Hadzic, the Netherlands ambassador said the European Union believed the UNTAES mission should be successful. He said it was very important that the local Serb community present their views and stands on accepting Croatian authority.

Sefers also said it was very encouraging that the Serb side was ready to continue contributing to the realization of the Erdut Agreement with its cooperativity.

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**FYROM: Foreign Ministry Sends Protest Note to Albania**

*AU0708193696 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 7 Aug 96 p 1*

[Macedonian Foreign Ministry's protest note to Tirana: "Attempt at Interference in Internal Affairs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] sent a protest note to the Republic of Albania in connection with the unusual resolution that was recently adopted by the new Albanian parliament after the imprisonment of the self-proclaimed "president" and a group of professors at the illegal university in Mala Recica. The note was accompanied by a reminder of the accomplishment of the right of minorities in our country to education in their mother tongue, which was handed to the respective Albanian Ministry by Macedonian Ambassador Nikola Todorcevski in Albania.

The Macedonian Foreign Ministry assessed the views that were presented in the resolution as an "attempt at interference into the internal affairs of the Republic of Macedonia," and regarding the way in which it was adopted—without any arguments—it is said that "not only does it not contribute to development of good neighborly relations, but it also threatens the question of overall security in the region and in the entire neighborhood at large."

The system of fulfillment of minority rights in Macedonia, including the Albanian minority as well, the note continues, is in full conformity with European and world standards for protection of minority rights, and in some segments, particularly in the field of education and local government, it is even above the standards. Expressing its expectations that the same standards and practice toward minorities, including the Macedonian minority as well, also be introduced in Albania, the Macedonian Foreign Ministry points out the following: "All measures for obstructing activities for formation of illegal educational institutions of any group or minority in Macedonia have been taken in conformity with the positive laws of the state and in conformity with international standards. The rule of rights and respect for laws and court decisions are of great importance for the development of democracy in every country," the Macedonian note says.

At yesterday's news conference with Macedonian journalists, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ognen Malevski stated that, after the summer vacations, the Macedonian Government is considering enlarging the text of the reminder that was lodged with the Albanian Government with more figures and facts and sending it to all European and international organizations, like the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the United Nations, and so on, with the aim of truly informing these institutions of the actual realization of the right of national minorities living in the Republic of Macedonia to education in their mother tongue.

**FYROM: PDP 'Hypocrites' Denounced by 'Tetovo University'**

*AU0708193296 Skopje MIC in English 7 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The president of the mercenary Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] and his party are hypocrites and whenever they face a difficult situation, they make bombastic statements saying that they will stop the disgraceful cooperation with the 'Slav Macedonian Government' unless the Tetovo 'phantom university' is legalized."

This is said among the rest in the announcement of the Information Service of the "Tetovo University" which was published in yesterday's issue of FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT.

This Announcement is a response of the "Tetovo University" to the statement that PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] President Abdurahman Aliti gave to the Albanian Radio, in which he announced that his party would leave the state institutions "unless the Law on Tertiary Education legalizes the Tetovo University."

In the Announcement published in FLAKA, "the Tetovo University" assesses Aliti's statement to the Albanian State Radio as "ridiculous and demagogic" and claims that "it is nothing new to the public inside and outside Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. It was given by a shameless and irresponsible vassal." According to the "Tetovo University," the goal of this step of PDP is "as always, to cheat the people" and to convince them that "PDP is ready to do something for the benefit of the University. In fact, their goal is to continue their political fusion with the anti-Albanian government and to keep their comfort, their personal, and family interests for a few more days, until their chief throws them away like a squeezed lemon."

"Finally, we are not at all interested whether the fawners of PDP remain in the Slav parliament and Macedonia's Government, but we publicly demand that they stop their engagements regarding the Tetovo University and do not interfere in its matters," the Announcement of the Information Service of the Tetovo University said.

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**FYROM: Albanian Parties Discuss Tetovo Issue**

*AU0908131396 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 9 Aug 96 p 3*

[Article by I. A.: "PDPA-NDP: Sulejmani's Imprisonment Will Dearly Cost the Frivolous Macedonian Establishment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The decision of the Macedonian Court, that is of its mentor—the Government of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—to jail the outstanding authors from Tetovo University, Professor Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, Miljaimn Fejziu, Musli Halimi, Professor Nevzat Halili, and Arben Rusi, uncovered the wrong strategy of the Macedonian Government to the Albanian question." This was said at yesterday's news conference of the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] and NDP [People's Democratic Party].

"The incarceration of the president [of the university] and the others represents a continuation of the xenophobic culture of a legal system in which the idea is penalized," said PDPA spokesman Alaetin Demiri, who was chairing the news conference. Demiri compared the present situation in Macedonia with the one in former Yugoslavia. He qualified "the last imprisonment, the demonstrations, and the homogenization of the Albanian political subject" as "natural reactions of self-defense" and "remnants of a political project that destroyed Yugoslavia."

"The imprisonment of the president and the others of the university will be dearly paid by the frivolous Macedonian establishment. The resolution of the Albanian Parliament is the first 'installment' that will be followed by others," the two parties assess.

Asked about the precise meaning of "dearly paid," Arben Dzaferi, PDPA president, explained that with the incarceration of the five "university authors," the Macedonian authorities are extensively damaging to the reputation that Macedonia has gained in the last four years, as well as to the image that it has been constructing with great difficulties.

Dzaferi, who has recently returned from his visit to the United States, announced that the U.S. Congress is expected to adopt a resolution soon, which will be similar to the one of the Albanian Parliament, in which it will condemn the arrest of Sulejmani and the others. Dzaferi visited the United States together with NDP President Iljaz Halimi, the president of the Association of Albanian Women in Macedonia Mukjereme Rusi, and the vice president of the "Tetovo University" Agni Dika in the "absence" of Sulejmani, the top person of the "university."

Dzaferi said that the Albanian lobby in the United States and a number of Republican and Democrat congressmen, with whom the delegation of Albanian parties and organizations in Macedonia had had contacts, had promised to provide for this resolution.

"Our policy is a result of the wrong policy of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia," Dzaferi said and he assessed that "all of us in the country are already paying the price on the economic, social, and cultural plan."

Iljaz Halimi, president of the NDP, explained the remarks of his party and of the PDPA related to the way in which some missions and international organizations are informed on the situation in Macedonia and particularly on the situation concerning the rights of the Albanians. "Some missions, and the OSCE, send to their centers subjective reports, which is something that we, as well as some other international monitors, have reprimanded," Halimi said. The president of the NDP announced that in the future the Albanian parties themselves will send parallel information to the centers of the international monitors.

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**Poland: Daily, Ministry Spokesman Comment on Eliach Article**

*WS0808134496 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 8 Aug 96 p 2*

[Untitled commentary by Zygmunt Slomkowski]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yaffa Eliach is fully entitled to try to find the truth about the tragedy of her childhood and to demand that those who are responsible for it, if they are still alive, be brought to justice. However, it is hard to understand the text she has written, which includes slanders about the participation of the Polish authorities in the "big lie," the purpose of which was to enable Poles to evade responsibility for pogroms in the years 1944-46. For example, she resents the fact that the Justice Ministry did not use her as a witness. Meanwhile, as we have been informed, in line with international procedure, six months ago the ministry asked its counterpart ministry in the United States to conduct such an interview (when the issue first surfaced) and now it is waiting for the protocol. Only after the ministry receives the protocol will it be possible to institute legal proceedings. Inwardly, she also bears a grudge against President Kwasniewski, who, when asked about proceedings in the Ejszyski case at a news conference, replied that this question should be directed to the embassy employee responsible for Jewish issues.

Unfortunately, what Ms. Eliach has written can only be looked upon as an attempt to derail the Polish-Jewish agreement and is adding emotion and slander to a process that requires calm and sensibility.

Incidentally, this sad issue reminds us that there are circles in Poland that stimulate and fuel the extremism shown by Ms. Eliach. It is sufficient to recall the way in which they attempted to present the Kielce pogrom or the way in which they (such as the authors of another "Extraordinary Appeal" television program) obstinately defend Jozef Kuras (alias "Fire"), who was responsible for killing a few dozen Jews. Indeed, although since 1989 Poland has made every effort to find those authorities of the Polish People's Republic who were responsible for real and imaginary offenses, the issue of murdering Jews has remained away from the spotlight.

The lack of honesty in this tragic issue, which was caused by political and ideological motives, is now reaping its harvest. Therefore, even if we do not agree with Ms. Eliach's primary line of reasoning, we should seriously examine the reasons for her emotional allegations.

[On 8 August, Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish carried on page 11 a 300-word report by Ma.K. entitled "The Home Army Accused of Killing Jews; the Justice Ministry: The Information Is Biased." After summarizing Professor Eliach's article that was contributed to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the author writes that Judge Andrzej Cubala, press spokesman of the justice minister, told RZECZPOSPOLITA that the article is biased and false. Then the report reads that the ministry is still waiting for a transcript of the interview with Ms.Eliach, which is to be sent by the U.S. Department of Justice].

**Poland: Antiterror-Crime Initiative To Be Submitted to UN**

*WS0908094296 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 8 Aug 96 p 6*

[Interview with Eugeniusz Wyzner, secretary of state in the Polish Foreign Affairs Ministry, by Krystyna Szelestowska; place and date not given: "A Polish Initiative at the UN; Organized Crime Zeroed In On"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szelestowska] You have reportedly sent UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali a letter in which Poland proposes to submit at the next session of the UN General Assembly the draft of an international convention regarding the combating of organized crime [prezestepczosc zorganizowana]. I understand that this is a draft document drawn up by Poland.

[Wyzner] Indeed, it is our initiative. It is a very timely initiative if we look at the growing threats posed by organized crime not only in Poland and Europe. We have, unfortunately, seen several dramatic examples over the past few weeks, such as the bomb attack on a building occupied by Americans in Saudi Arabia and the explosion in the Olympic Centennial Park in Atlanta during the Olympic Games.

[Szelestowska] Does this mean that the idea of preparing this convention has not emerged in recent weeks?

[Wyzner] No, it has not. The cause of combating international crime and our contribution to it has a long history. Suffice it to say that, at the World Conference of Ministers, which took place late in 1994 in Naples and was devoted to organized crime, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, at that time justice minister of the Polish Republic and now prime minister, put forward an idea of combating organized crime jointly, an idea of waging a fight that would go beyond the borders of a given country or region. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz submitted such a proposal at a recent conference of the Baltic states as well. The prime minister also presented it during the EU summit meeting in Florence. Now we are going to present it to a larger group of countries, to all the UN member states—185 countries in all. A joint fight against organized crime, which has become a great plague, will become more effective.

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[Szelestowska] Exactly what proposals does the aforementioned draft document contain?

[Wyzner] The document is being prepared in the Justice Ministry, with which the Foreign Affairs Ministry is cooperating very closely. It is difficult to present an outline of this document right now; I will only say that we are preparing it in such a way as to make it acceptable to all countries, although they differ from one another significantly: They have different political systems, different approaches to the judiciary, and so forth. The purpose is to see to it that not only individuals, but also institutions, organizations, and so forth can be held responsible. This is all the more important because not all countries are equally willing to punish their criminals, to extradite them. A good example is Libya, which, as we remember very well, does not want to extradite two of its secret agents who are suspected of having planted a bomb in a U.S. airliner that was blown up over the United Kingdom a few years ago.

[Szelestowska] Does this mean that this convention would also concern the crime of terrorism?

[Wyzner] It certainly would, as well as other crimes, such as trade in people, including children or women, drug smuggling and trafficking, money laundering.

[Szelestowska] Will the draft be discussed at the next session of the UN?

[Wyzner] We hope that once it goes through the required procedures, it will be discussed during a general debate. It is worth recalling that the next session of the General Assembly begins on 17 September.

**Poland: Sejm Passes Amended Reform of Government Administration**

*WS0908110996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Aug 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "Reform of the Central Administration Finally Passed. Strong Prime Minister of a Political Government"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Senate amendments to a package of bills concerning the reform of the central administration were subject to a Sejm debate on Thursday [8 August]. The deputies decided that it will be the prime minister who will define ministers' powers and not a law, as the Senate had wanted. In case of a government replacement, a new prime minister will have three months to accept the resignations of ministers, deputy ministers, voivodes, and deputy voivodes.*

The Senate submitted nearly 120 amendments to seven out of the 11 bills regulating the reform of the central administration. One of the fundamental changes in the bills is the establishment of purely political offices in the administration, whose chiefs will be changed with a replacement of the Cabinet. Thus, the offices of ministers, deputy ministers, voivodes, and deputy voivodes (so-called government officials) will be filled according to political guidelines. Although the deputies supported a Senate amendment giving the prime minister three months to make decisions concerning dismissals of these officials, the replacement of ministers and deputy ministers would be obligatory, while, with regard to voivodes and deputy voivodes, the prime minister could leave them in their offices.

Previously, the Sejm decided by a margin of one vote that the prime minister would automatically accept dismissals of all government officials.

However, the Sejm did not agree to legislatively define tasks of individual ministers (this amendment was supported by the Polish Peasant Party, while the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] was against it). Jerzy Jaskiernia (SLD) argued that this would restrict the prime minister's powers. Tadeusz Syryjczyk (the Union of Freedom [UW]) had a similar opinion and argued that one of the main goals of the reform is to strengthen the prime minister's position within the government.

At the same time, the deputies approved the senators' amendment making it possible for the government to be represented before the Sejm not only by a minister, but also by a plenipotentiary or central institution chief, despite the fact that they had previously turned down this proposal.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers will appoint a secretary and under secretary of state at the request of a relevant minister. It was decided that a minister will have only one secretary of state, although the Senate had suggested that the number of secretaries of state should be unrestricted.

This amendment was opposed by Tadeusz Syryjczyk, among others, who argued that a larger number of deputy ministers will introduce chaos in the organization of ministries.

According to the adopted amendments, a part of the special administration, which had initially been subordinated to voivodes, regained its autonomy owing to the Senate. This refers to voivodship sanitary and pharmaceutical inspectors and the State Fire Department (this amendment was opposed by the UW, among others, which believed that the special administration's subordination to voivodes would decentralize government).

After the new bills become effective, some of the current ministries will be liquidated, and new structures will

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be set up. In place of the Office of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a Ministry of Administration and Internal Affairs will be set up. A Government Center for Strategic Studies will be established as well.

Also established will be a Central Office for Housing and City Development, which will take over the powers of the Ministry of Construction. A Ministry of the State Treasury will be set up, while the Ministry of Ownership Transformations will be abolished.

The chairman of the Committee for Scientific Research will be a member of the Council of Ministers.

In addition, the deputies passed a Senate amendment to the law on privatization of state-owned companies, according to which at least every second member of the supervisory boards of particularly important single-proprietor Treasury-owned companies will be appointed from among candidates presented by an appropriate minister.

However, the deputies rejected a Senate amendment obliging the Treasury minister to use the property of liquidated or bankrupt state-owned companies to finance their liquidation and cover the expenditures on bankruptcy procedures.

The UW demanded that a Senate amendment preventing the Privatization Agency from conducting activities different from privatization be passed. According to Tadeusz Syryjczyk, this would eliminate the possibility of corruption. Yet the Sejm rejected this amendment. [passage omitted]

**[Box, p 2]**

The first decisions concerning the reform will become effective in October. For example, special services will come under the prime minister's jurisdiction, the Ministry of Ownership Transformations will be abolished, and a Ministry of the Treasury and an Agency for Issues of Privatization will be established. Voivodes will take over approximately 1,300 companies that are currently under the jurisdiction of ministers.

At the beginning of January, the Office of the Council of Ministers, the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Industry, Foreign Economic Cooperation, and Construction, and the Central Planning Office will cease to exist. A Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, a Ministry of Economy, a Chancellery of the Council of Ministers' Chairman, a Government Center for Strategic Studies, an Office of Housing and City Development, and a Committee for European Integration will be established.

**Poland: ROP Sets Up Alliance To Attract Entrepreneurs**

*WS0908095296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 9 Aug 96 p 3*

[Untitled report by WZ and PAP, under the "Country in Brief" rubric]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] has established the Economic Alliance, which will consist of owners of small and medium-sized business. [ROP Chairman] Jan Olszewski has promised them that the Alliance would enable them to exert influence on the ROP economic program and that after the elections they would be able to have influence on the economic policies carried out by the state and self-government authorities. He announced that his party would form an electoral bloc with their organizations. There would not be room in it for "salon politicians often representing only symbolic parties and completely unaware of the socioeconomic situation of the country." In this way, Olszewski refers to the parties that make up the Solidarity Election Action.

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**Slovenia: Kracun Views Relations With Croatia, Border**

*AU0708114796 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Aug 96 pp 6-7*

[Interview with Dr. Davorin Kracun, newly appointed minister of foreign affairs in the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, by Ivan Botteri; place and date not given: "We Will Find the Sea Border Through an Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The new minister of foreign affairs in the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Dr. Davorin Kracun, even before he was elected minister, said that "he had no diplomatic experience like Kissinger," but that he had conducted many projects that had to do with the international affirmation of Slovenia, and that there was no need to worry that he would not be capable of doing all the tasks of the minister of foreign affairs in the next couple of months. This 45-year-old doctor of economic sciences used these words to answer the unexpected criticism from the opposition. One should say that he has already been minister in the first government of Dr. Drnovsek, when he was in charge of the department of planning, and then for two years he was the minister of economic relations and development, until January 1995, when that department was taken over by the Christian Democrats, and Dr. Kracun returned to his department at Maribor University. However, he has remained in touch with his party colleague, Dr. Drnovsek, and his government, because he has also discharged the duty of the president of the government's economic council.*

**Limited Time**

[Botteri] Mr. Minister, what expectations do you have at the moment as you take over the role of the leader of Slovenian foreign policy, and what do you want to achieve personally in these couple of months until the expiry of the election mandate?

[Kracun] For me personally, the conduct of foreign policy is a challenge in the sense that early in the mandate of this government I discharged the duties of minister for economic relations and development, where I also had an opportunity to become acquainted with the problems of economic relations with foreign countries, so that the problems I will be running into are not new for me. Of course, I would like to solve as many problems as possible in the short period I have at my disposal, but it is a limited period in which it is not realistic to set objectives that are too high and too ambitious. The basic direction in my conduct of foreign policy will be: security and welfare. Whatever we succeed in doing toward these two objectives will be good!

[Botteri] You started your first week at work as the new minister of foreign affairs by visiting the seat of the European Commission in Brussels. The first formal steps of the Slovenian government in approaching the European Union have been completed by the delivery of the book of answers to questions from 23 fields. What will be the next steps of the Slovenian diplomacy in that process of approaching?

[Kracun] Slovenia has an ambition to be in the first group of states that will become new full members of the European Union. That is confirmed by the analysis of our economic results and the views expressed in the European Commission. It is a fact that Slovenia, as a small country, is not in the focus of political attention like some other candidates for full membership, which can influence the way Slovenia is treated. Therefore our main task is to constantly follow what happens in the discussions about the spreading of the European Union, and always be prepared to present arguments for all solutions pertaining to Slovenia.

**Slovenia in Europe**

[Botteri] Are you referring here to the structural dialogue between Slovenia and the European Union?

[Kracun] Of course, but I am also thinking of our general presence in all discussions, and not only in the headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels. For, in the minds of some diplomats, Slovenia is not yet anchored as an especially significant partner, and the decisions on Slovenia are being made not only in Brussels, but also in all fifteen member states. There you need a lot of convincing through arguments, lobbying, and, of course, realization of necessary economic results, political stability, and observation of democratic standards.

[Botteri] What are the important tasks of the Slovenian economy in the process of adapting to the requests of the European Union?

[Kracun] The Slovenian economy is already in the process of adaptation, because the disintegration of Yugoslavia has left a large part of the Slovenian economy bereft of a market, so that orientation to the world market has been a priority since the moment of gaining Slovenia's independence. Slovenian companies have found their partners primarily in the countries of the European Union, so that a large part of the adaptation of the country to the conditions of the European Union occurred through coordination of legislatures. The main problem for Slovenian companies is competitiveness in the world market in the future conditions of the common

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market in Europe. The association agreement envisages asymmetry, which means that Slovenia can gradually, until the year of 2001, diminish measures of customs protection until they are completely canceled, with the maintenance of its share in the market. This reflection of competitiveness will certainly be a serious problem for the Slovenian economy.

[Botteri] We notice that both Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek and you in your first statements mention "settlement of relations with Croatia" as one of the first tasks of the Slovenian foreign policy. Where do you intend to start from, that is, to continue? What do you expect is possible to achieve first in relations with Croatia?

[Kracun] We have developed good relations with Croatia. It is a fact that even before we were part of one common state, and that the division of that state was not smooth, so that at the moment of division the problems could not be solved in the way the Czechs and the Slovaks succeeded in solving theirs between themselves. Therefore, there are several unsolved problems between Slovenia and Croatia. I think that those problems are gradually being solved. For instance, two agreements have recently been solved, the agreement on the division of Slovenia and Croatia's financial obligations toward Italy from the Treaty of Rome, which is very important for the position of Slovenia and Croatia in the negotiations with Italy. Then, let us mention the solution of the problem of the health insurance of the Slovenian pensioners who live in Croatia. These recent examples are proofs that with serious work and understanding of the problems and limitations of the other side we can solve many things, if not everything. It would be ideal if, with one single agreement between our two countries, we could solve all the problems that we inherited from the former common state. In practice it has proved that there was a variety of problems, from the defining of borders to property-rights relations. Therefore it would perhaps be better if we were less ambitious and if we started to solve those problems in which the criteria are clearer. The criteria regarding ownership and property relations are, in principle, very clear, so that it would be good if we started to solve the problems in the field of property-rights relations, in line with the European standards. The negotiations are under way, and in many things we are close to a solution, for instance regarding the property-rights agreement and the agreement on the status and usage of the Krsko Nuclear Plant. We need only an extra effort to solve these two problems within a relatively short period.

**Political Will**

[Botteri] Do we need only an extra effort or political will, too?

[Kracun] Extra effort means that there is political will onboth sides.

[Botteri] Regarding the fact that we are neighbors and that wehave a lot of open questions, which obviously slow down the development on both sides, do you not think that we should have an agreement on obligatory terms for the two [foreign] ministers to meet during the year?

[Kracun] There is somehow an unwritten agreement that we meet when we can expect our meeting to give concrete results, so, when negotiations reach the concluding phase. Personally, I would have nothing against regular meetings, although our ministries already have contacts on a regular basis. I do not think there is a communication problem between Slovenia and Croatia.

[Botteri] How does the Slovenian side assess the results and the dynamics achieved in solving the border issues so far, primarily regarding the procedure of coordinating the border line?

[Kracun] The border issue has two parts. One is the border on the mainland, and the other chapter is the border at sea. The border on the mainland is a relatively easy problem, becausethat border has already existed and one only has to define it moreprecisely and mark it where it has not been marked. Thediplomatic commission for the borders has marked 48 border pointsthat had not been coordinated, or where a problem is indicated. After additional coordination 22 points were solved, whileanother 26 points need additional coordination. This is an ongoing activity of the diplomatic commission and is not a politicalproblem. The other part is the sea border, where there was previously no border. We need an agreement between two states, which would respect the interests of both sides.

[Botteri] Does that mean that areas of dispute will continue to exist for some time on the border between Slovenia and Croatia?

[Kracun] In diplomacy border issues are said to belong to thegroup of questions that are solved over the long term. It is no good rushing here!

[Botteri] In such circumstances of disputed areas, how is itpossible to arrange the regime of life along the border, so that until the moment of the final solution there are no disagreements of any kind?

[Kracun] I think that both sides think that it helps nobody if an incident occurs, and I can conclude with

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pleasure that fewer and fewer incidents ar occurring on the border. This year is especially calm, which is a proof of the maturity of both states, so that even in situations that have not been envisaged or determined in the agreements, both sides behave in such a way that there are no conflict situations. Probably it would not be good to prejudice the settlement of the border issue in advance, because the question of sovereignty of both states is a delicate question that must be solved permanently. I want to emphasize that the unsolved question of the sea borders must not prevent normal life and cooperation.

**Border on River Mura**

[Botteri] The events in everyday life tell us that the existingprovisional "regimes" are not efficient?

[Kracun] Of course, it will be best when we have a determined border and when we organize regimes for living in such conditions.

[Botteri] Recently, some problems have arisen regarding theauthority of the police control along the River Mura. Attemptsto settle this situation between the local authorities have notalways been feasible. How does your diplomacy approach this problem?

[Kracun] Real troubles occur when the formal elements ofsetting up state borders differ from natural and living elements.Here we are talking about the lack of coordination between a natural and a cadastral border, about the changes of the River Mura water channel, which means that this part of the border should be studied in detail point by point, and the border set up in such a way that it does not hinder the life of the population on either side of the border. Therefore we pay special attention to the groups of people with the goodwill to give us a significant boost to solve that problem in line with their habits and expectations. I think that, on an expert level, it is possible to reach draft final solutions for this area along the River Mura.

[Botteri] Slovenia is already in CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association], Croatia is preparing to join CEFTA. Regarding your experience as minister for economic relations and your experience from the scientific field, what is your opinion about thepossibility of Slovenia and Croatia participating in the conditions of the economic association of CEFTA?

[Kracun] I think that CEFTA provides a good perspective for both countries. CEFTA appeared spontaneously from the needs of the states after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Those are, primarily, the states that have a long-term interest in joining the European Union, and which have been struck by the loss of the traditional markets and therefore they are strongly interested in mutual participation. Our Slovenian experience with CEFTA is very positive. At the beginning Slovenia was signing bilateral agreements on free trade with individual members, and then joined full membership. In all cases of the agreements signed there was a great increase in economic participation at the rate of even 50 or more percent. It is probably a good course for Croatia, too.For the states that count on membership in the European Union open their markets and thus strengthen competition. So, CEFTA meansa gradual opening to competition. Slovenia is interested in Croatia's joining European integrations. Our states are mutually significant economic partners and within these frameworks I can see possibilities for successful economic participation.

[Botteri] What are Slovenia's possibilities and expectations inthe programs of the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and arethere any common points with the neighboring Croatia, which in thatcase is also the main transit state?

[Kracun] We consider that Slovenia's has a significant rolein the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that certainlinks and coordination between Slovenia and Croatia would strengthen the economic position of both states in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Botteri] What is your opinion about the effects of the introduction of visas for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia?

[Kracun] In our opinion, that is a step toward normalization in the flow of people between states. Before our government made that decision, the entry of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina was notregulated at all. Slovenia will try to apply the most favorableregimes for the entry and transit of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One needs to know that for security reasons in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the primary purpose for this precaution is that there is still a large number of refugees and we do not know where they will settle. This regime is provisional until circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina are consolidated. At the beginning there were complaints and a lack of understanding, but now the visa rule is being carried out without problem.

**[Box, p 6]**

**Ljubljana Bank**

[Botteri] What is your opinion about opportunities to solve the problem of the Ljubljana Bank debt toward the Croatian savers?

[Kracun] The problem of the Ljubljana Bank is primarily one of the succession after the disintegration of

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former Yugoslavia. The problem of a bank is always the problem of its debits and its credits. If we take a look at this problem from the point of view of its debts, we can see enormous amounts. So, the second question is what the situation of its credits is, because in normal circumstances a bank settles its debts from its credits.Basically, this is the question of succession par excellence.Unfortunately, discussions about succession have gone on for so long that it might be good if this problem were included in the structure of solving the property-rights problems, although one must also solve the aforementioned bank credits because a real solution of debts always comes from the credits. It is interesting that some Slovenian economists suggest that theLjubljana Bank took over at least the part of the debt it has towardthe savers from Croatia, who continued to be formal savers in theLjubljana Bank and they suggest that this question be solved as apriority. This problem would be left to the Ljubljana Bank and itsexpert opinion to solve it, although I think that the best solutionlies within the succession issue, or within the wider solution ofthe property-rights question.

**[Box, p 7]**

**Vacation in Croatia**

[Botteri] What would you like to say to our readership, Slovenians who live in Croatia, and your citizens who are spending their vacations along the Croatian coast?

[Kracun] I myself am thinking about spending a week or two onvacation somewhere on the Croatian coast, if I manage to find the time. What do I want to say? Primarily regarding the fact thatSlovenia and Croatia still face some unsolved questions, these are no obstacle for a favorable development of mutual relations between both states in all areas of interest, they are no obstacle f.. both to see a good and reliable partner in each other as neighbors, both an economic and political partner, because in that way we feel more secure. The common interest of our two states is a gradual integration into Euro-Atlantic mechanisms. I want to keep the trend of positive development of good relations, so that we can gradually solve the problems that we inherited through the stormy disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and coexist as good neighbors.

**Slovenia: Article Outlines 4 Proposals for Electoral Change**

*AU0708123096 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 5 Aug 96 p 2*

[Article by Majda Vukelic: "Differences in Systems Evident but Difficult To Comprehend"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 5 August—Understanding the electoral systems is a complicated task in itself. If one can explain at the theoretical level what the majority electoral system and the proportional representation mean and what are the differences between the two, one can become mightily bogged down by even attempting to explain what each of the systems means when translated into concrete numbers that depend on the method of ascertaining the electoral outcome. Doubtlessly, none of the systems is ideal, and each of them has its good and bad points.

For that reason, the Slovene voters will not have it easy at all when they will have to decide at the referendum, the date of which will be determined at the extraordinary session of parliament on Wednesday, which of the four electoral models is the closest to them and which they, thus, support. Matters are further complicated because the voters will be faced with four electoral questions, the contents of which are very different. To understand what each of the models would introduce to our political scene, one requires a vast theoretical knowledge.

If we were to explain in the broadest of outlines what an individual referendum question entails, then we would have "the easiest task" with the proposal that, among the bevy of questions, occupies first place, namely, the proposal of the group of 35 deputies. This departs from the proportional representation system that we employed in 1992 (a vote cast by a voter means a vote for an individual party), from which it deviates in some details. The most striking is the abolition of the so-called national lists, that is, the lists via which the party officials who are heading them safeguard themselves a seat in the parliament. The group of 35 deputies further proposes that the same number of deputies should be elected in all eight electoral units, namely 11, (two seats are reserved for the representatives of the ethnic minorities, which is a regulation contained in all four proposals) and that those who win the most votes in an electoral unit will be elected.

The second proposal, by the State Council, introduces a combined majority-proportional representation system. The country would be divided into 44 electoral districts and, in each of them, the voters would, in two-tier elections, elect a deputy (the majority system) directly. This would yield half of the deputies (44), while the

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other 44 would be supplied by the parties (those that won at least 3.5 percent), dividing the number of seats proportionately to the number of votes won in the electoral units. A voter would, in such a case, thus have two votes. One would be given to an individual candidate in the electoral district and the other to a party.

**Proposals of the Social Democrats of Slovenia and the Slovene People's Party**

The proposal of the Social Democrats and more than 40,000 voters [who signed the petition] departs from the majority electoral system. The state would be divided into as many districts as there are seats in parliament, therefore 88 (namely, the Constitutional Court ruled that setting two seats in the parliament aside for the representatives of the Slovenes abroad is unconstitutional). In any electoral district, one deputy would be elected with the majority of votes. Since, most often, no candidate wins a majority of votes in the first round, especially if there are several candidates in a district, the voters would go to the polling stations again and chose among the two candidates that won the greatest number of votes in the first round.

The fourth proposal is the proposal of the Liberal Democrats, that is, of a group of 30 voters that aspires to legalize a pure proportional representation system. Slovenia would, in such a case, consist of only one electoral unit, into which all 88 deputies would be voted, where an individual party would get the share of seats in the State Chamber in proportion to the support it enjoyed among the voters. Each voter would have one vote, but the introduction of the so-called preferential vote would allow him, not merely to cast his vote for the party as a whole, but also for the candidate he likes the most on the party list. This means that the candidate from the party list who wins the most voters will be elected, thus making it immaterial whether he is situated at the head or at the bottom of the list.

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## Federal

### FRY: Recent Personnel Shifts in Army Analyzed

*96BA0410B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jul 96 pp 20-21*

[Article by Aleksandar Vasovic, AIM News Agency: "Is Perisic on the Way Out?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has recently been reported that 126 corps commanders and field officers of the Army of Yugoslavia [VJ] have given written notice to Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, that remanding General Ratko Mladic to The Hague tribunal "would be yet another great and immeasurable defeat for the Serbian people."

The signers of the petition, according to NEDELJNI TELEGRAF, also include several generals who are corps commanders. Milosevic has not replied to that letter to this day. However, well-informed sources close to the GS VJ [General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia] say that they have not even heard of this letter and that if it exists at all it could well have been created by malcontents hurt by the most recent shufflings of personnel within the VJ.

#### Purse Strings

The same sources recalled that two months ago high-level officers responsible for morale, legal matters, and security, debated the position of the VJ on remanding officers indicted by The Hague tribunal. And in a debate which at some points was impassioned there were two dominant currents; the first argued that Yugoslav officers must not by any means be delivered into the hands of international justice, but if after an investigation it turns out that they have committed any crime or war crime, they should be tried in the country. Opponents said that the time had come to honor the will of the international community. The fate of Gen. Ratko Mladic was also taken up on that occasion.

Those who were more loyal said that they should not play games with Milosevic and recalled that "we know quite well who holds the purse strings." The result of the conference was a compromise—wait for the decision of the political leadership and act accordingly. That caused agitation in the officer corps, especially among officers with combat experience. However, there was no indication that it ever occurred to anyone to send a petition to Slobodan Milosevic. As it was put, "the letter or petition, whether it existed or not, is only a manifestation of the very bad situation in which the Yugoslav armed forces find themselves."

In the meantime, a decree of the Supreme Defense Council has retired, but also promoted, several generals. What distinguishes this castling move in the corps of generals, the smallest one so far, is the retirement of Gen. Bora Ivanovic and promotion of Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic.

Bora Ivanovic is well known for his spectacular break-out from the surrounded garrison in Vukovar, after which he was promoted to the rank of general at meteoric speed. In the meantime, he was involved in unlawful trade in fuel and building materials belonging to the state. During the investigation which followed certain ammunition was mentioned more than once, as were contacts with a confidential person of all the Serbian secret services, Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic, who at that time was the sovereign ruler of a feudal estate in the vicinity of Erdut. Once notice was given that there could be a scandal, Ivanovic was speedily amnestied by Zoran Lilic, FRY president. Bora Ivanovic's retirement is interpreted as the state's attempt to push the scandal under a rug like a bad housekeeper and forget about it as soon as possible.

#### The Police

Dragoljub Ojdanic, formerly commander of the 1st Army, has been installed in the position of deputy chief of the GS VJ. This actually is not a promotion, because the position of commander of the strongest formation of the Yugoslav armed forces is far more important than an office in Knez Milos Street in Belgrade. The real reason for this transfer, analysts here say, are the close ties Gen. Ojdanic has with the highest circles of the JUL [Yugoslav United Left] and SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia].

Gen. Ojdanic is also known to have very close relations with the top leadership of the Serbian MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], above all with Radovan "Badza" Stojicic, assistant minister of internal affairs of Serbia. It is therefore believed that Ojdanic's promotion is closely related to the secret policy of the Serbian police, which comes down to taking over influence on personnel policy in the VJ. It is assumed that Ojdanic's role is in fact to oversee the work of Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff, in order to avert a possible opposition to Slobodan Milosevic.

There is indication of how serious things really are in a recent statement which the chief of the General Staff made during a regular annual meeting with journalists on 16 June, Army Day. On the Kozara, the flagship of the river flotilla, Perisic resignedly declared that he had no intention to answer the questions of journalists, because "...it is better not to talk than to talk about something which is well known. What would have to be said would hurt many people." Those present

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almost unanimously interpreted that statement as an announcement of Momcilo Perisic's retirement, which, as matters stand, will most probably come before the end of the year.

**The Successor**

Perisic is seen in military circles either as a modest man or as a receiver in a bankrupt company whose task is to issue orders and not ask too many questions, to be satisfied with a miserable budget which is not enough even to feed the Army.

Momcilo Perisic's dissatisfaction began back when Slobodan Milosevic instituted the blockade on the Drina, and it culminated with the fall of Krajina. Slobodan Milosevic is said to have made this comment on the resignation which the chief of the General Staff offered at that time: Perisic ought in that case to return the ranks which he has received during all these years.

Ljubisa Velickovic, commander of the RV i PVO [Air Force and Air Defense], who has no burden from the war, appears to be the most serious candidate for the post of chief of the General Staff, because when the war began he headed the Federal Directorate for Flight Control, and it was there that he was promoted to the rank of general. Velickovic has the advantage, it is said, that he comes from Pozarevac and is completely loyal to the political leadership and to pacification of the rebellious military pilots, who are not really well-disposed toward him.

All in all, whoever takes over command of the Yugoslav armed forces will not have a pleasant duty. The Vienna Accord on reduction of military capacities in the Balkans will take away from Yugoslavia a large portion of the largest military scrap heap in the Balkans, but it will also pose the enigma of what, where, and how with the commissioned and noncommissioned officers who will be left without a job.

The assessment is that a large portion of the personnel from the technical services will find a livelihood in civilian life with relative ease. The police will "buy up" some of the field officers, but the lion's share of those discharged will become a burden of the state.

Nothing has come as yet of the military treaty with Russia, which was announced with pomp and ceremony by Pavle Bulatovic, defense minister, and Gen. Pavel Grachev, the recently discharged chief of the Russian General Staff. Although the embargo on importation of arms has been lifted, there is still an obstacle in the form of scanty funds. The Air Force will be replenished with several MI-24 helicopters, new MiG-29's, engines, and spare parts partially financed from the former debts of the Soviet Union to the former SFRY. All the rest, as sources in the Russian ministry have announced, will depend on Yugoslav bank accounts, and, as the Russians like to say, "hard currency."

**Patriots**

The Navy is steaming slowly toward the scrap heap, with a tendency to sell for a song whatever can be sold to private parties and to reduce the capacity intended for the new naval base at Valdanos to two or three frigates, a few submarines, and other small vessels.

The ground forces will continue to depend on the skill of domestic skilled mechanics in maintaining the combat equipment and systems in place, which is hopelessly outdated. Nothing has come of announcements of production of a new Whirlwind tank.

The plants do not exist which could reestablish assembly lines. The defense industry is not in production, but is limited almost exclusively to maintaining existing resources. And the special-purpose production operation of Crvena Zastava in Kragujevac has announced a cutback in production and layoffs.

A new doctrine is also to be formulated on use of the armed forces on the new battlefield and on the altered political environment. Although announced three years ago, this process has not yet been completed. When it is all added up, the murmuring concerning Ratko Mladic, Veselin Sljivancanin, and company, and other "national patriotic" forces, are only the external manifestations of the ill state of health. The Army has obviously played the role intended for it. It is now less and less necessary to the party in power. The police are much more essential.

**FRY: Dubrovnik, Herzeg Novi Sign Water Supply Agreement**

*LD0708195496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1923 GMT 7 Aug 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Herzeg Novi, August 7 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the Croatian town of Dubrovnik and the Yugoslav town of Hezceg Novi, both in southern Adriatic, signed in Debeli Breg, at the Yugoslav-Croatian border, Wednesday afternoon, an agreement on water supply and maintenance of the water supply system between the two towns.

After one year of negotiations, the two sides signed the ageement which concerns Herzeg Novi's water supply from the system of the Trebisnjica River (which passes through southern parts of the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia). The system ends at Plate near

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Dubrovnik. The agreement also covers the maintenance of the water pipeline from Plate to the Yugoslav border.

This agreement is of cucial importance for Herzeg Novi because it will ensure normal water supply from the Trebisnjica system, Djuro Cetkovic, the head of the Herzeg Novi negotiating team said.

He said that the agreement strcitly defined relations, obligations and rights of both sides and procedure for arbitration in case of violation of the agreement.

The head of the Dubrovnik negotiating team, Luka Glavina, welcomed the signing of the agreement and said that it would ease tension in this part of the border area.

## Serbia

**Serbia: Seselj Calls Recognition of Croatia 'Inexcusable Crime'**

*AU0808192596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1239 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 8 August (BETA)—The chairman of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Vojislav Seselj, said today that the talks between the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Milosevic and Tudjman respectively, were aimed definitively to seal the fate of the Serb Krajina.

"We do not expect anything good from the talks and, if Milosevic recognizes Croatia within its AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders [i.e. pre-1991 borders], that will be an inexcusable crime," Seselj said at a news conference, and assessed that "Milosevic will be duped even this time." [passage omitted]

He also announced that in the final stage of the election campaign of SRS in the Serb Republic the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, will take part.

**Serbia: SPO Blames Milosevic, Tudjman for War**

*AU0808184596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 August (BETA)—The Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] stated today that it does not "object" to yesterday's agreement in Athens between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, because the party "has always been for agreements, and against war; it has always been for peace and reason, and against death and hatred."

In a statement, the SPO says that such an attitude cannot be shaken even by "the sad fact that yesterday's agreement was reached by two men who are most responsible for the senseless and horrible war, death, refugees and suffering of millions of people."

"Why did Milosevic and Tudjman not agree on the normalization of relations four years ago, or three years ago? Why did yesterday's agreement not come about when nearly 1 million Serbs lived in Croatia, without waiting for the Serbs to be almost exterminated in that state?" wonders the SPO.

One gets an impression that Milosevic and Tudjman agreed earlier to undertake the normalization of Serbian-Croatian relations only when Croatia becomes cleansed of Serbs, the party says in the statement and adds that the SPO will never "accept the results of such a shameful deal, because it will fight for the return of Serbs to Krajina and elsewhere where they lived for ages."

**Serbia: SNS Sees Tudjman-Milosevic Talks as 'Overdue'**

*AU0808171896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 August (BETA)—The Congregational People's Party [SNS] has assessed today that the talks between the president of Croatia and Serbia, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic respectively, in Athens "are overdue, considering the consequences of the five-year war."

In a statement issued by the party, it is said that all talks so far between the two presidents "have always been covered with a veil of secrecy," while the results of their talks have always influenced the general situation in the region and were in most cases disadvantageous for the interest of Serbia and of the Serbian people.

The SNS supports peaceful solutions, but not if they are meant exclusively to improve the political rating of individuals, to strengthen them in power, and make possible a political dictat by the world powers, it is stressed in the statement.

## Montenegro

**Montenegro: Prime Minister on Relations With Neighbors, Debt**

*AU0908074296 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 31 Jul 96 p 2*

[Article by Gradisa Katic: "The Futile Stories of Succession Could Lead the FRY Again Into Hyperinflation and Ruin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I do not know what Djukic said, but I recently read that Djindjic had said this. Anyone

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who says something like this does not understand what is going on in Montenegro. And instead of looking into the Montenegrin backyard, it would be more useful if they began the privatization processes in Serbia. I am not dissatisfied with what is going on here. At the moment, the maximum has been done in regard to privatization in Montenegro. Today 90 percent of the companies in Montenegro are in the process of privatization, and this is a fact that no one can deny, regardless of which political perspective they view it from."

This is how the Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic responded when asked to comment on Radoje Djukic's statement that very little had been done in Montenegro regarding privatization in comparison to what had been done in Serbia. Djukanovic said this last Friday in Cetinje, where he held talks with Milan Panic and the board of directors of his American ICN [expansion unknown] Pharmaceuticals company.

When he mentioned the "futile stories about succession," Djukanovic was asked whether this meant that Montenegro did not agree with Serbia's point of view in this regard.

"To be precise, we do not agree with a procedure so exhausting that it demands a previous clarification of all details, and then moves on to a normalization of relations. If we want to open up to the international community, we must first regulate our relations with our neighbors," Djukanovic said. No matter how difficult this may be, regardless of the psychological burden of traumas from the immediate past, it must be clear that nothing can be done if we do not regulate relations with our neighbors from former Yugoslavia. This is the condition under which we can talk to Russia, America, and the developed world. Regarding the fact that we are postponing this through some kind of exhausting procedures and the gathering of certain information and supplements for [use in] the definite agreements regarding succession—I think that it is not rational that we have to deal with those pragmatic issues, which pertain to our interests as well, that could easily be taken care of. If we continue to follow this futile procedure, it could happen that the FRY could again have hyperinflation and that the country would be totally ruined.

When asked who he concretely thinks is "exhausting himself in futile talks," the Montenegrin prime minister said: "I am thinking of the teams that are dealing with these issues on the level of the FRY, because their approach obviously lacks a link to reality, as well as to the actual economic and social problems that we have in Yugoslavia. These problems need solutions right away."

Djukanovic had recently said that Montenegro had bought back one third of its debt. This was followed with a refutation of this statement. With regard to this, in Cetinje the prime minister said the following:

"I have read the refutations in the newspapers. This is absolute nonsense. Before the sanctions against Yugoslavia were imposed Montenegro had bought back $170 million of its foreign debt; this is not an issue. It had done this through the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], therefore through the FRY's corresponding departments. At that time there were many creditor banks abroad, and full documentation about this exists in the NBJ. The talk as to whether one republic could have done this without the other is therefore totally redundant. All this is done under the control of the corresponding departments of the NBJ. There were also active cooperation and a presentation of offers to pay off of the debt to these departments."

## Kosovo

### Kosovo: Recent Attacks Deemed 'Albanian Propaganda'

*AU0908072496 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 96 p 2*

[Commentary by Miljan Vuksanovic: "Separatist Smog"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian propaganda in and around Kosovo has outdone even itself.

This has been shown during the recent attacks against the police stations in Pristina, Podujevo, Krpimej, and Luzani, when they hurled bombs and fired guns. Twisting the facts, Albanian propagandists say that the "Serb side and Serb policy," as always, is responsible for these terrorist attacks. The attacks themselves are minimized and reduced to "incidents," as published in the latest issue of "Bujku." According to this newspaper, which is controlled by the separatist leader Ibrahim Rugova, these attacks are "a wave of incidents that are renewed every two months, most recently in the form of provocations and set ups."

In a commentary published by the Information Center of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], there is no trace of doubt that this was a staged incident that is being exaggerated to justify, as this propaganda center claims, Serb terror!? Naturally, according to them, "Serb policy is responsible for the explosive situation in Kosovo and the terrorist attacks against Albania citizens!"

Without doubt, such propaganda texts are devoid of any truth and are totally without logic. Is it logical that

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someone from "Belgrade," as they say, would stage an attack on the police? Who would throw bombs at police stations in Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija], kill policemen and innocent people, if not fervent separatists, who without scruples and at any price, want to draw international attention to their goals? In fact, that is indirectly admitted in the mentioned commentary of the DSK, in which the unsolved incidents, as they refer to them with cynicism, are used as a motive and "proof" to invoke the international community and to step up the finding of a "just solution" to the Kosovo issue.

This, as interpreted by people who are knowledgeable in the political climate of this area, would have to mean that the purpose of the terrorist attacks and tensions created in Kosovo is to compel the European, and particularly American monitors, to come here. That would pave the way for a greater American presence in this area and the appointment of a special American envoy for Kosovo. As a matter of fact, that idea was first launched by the Albanian lobbyist [as published], Eliot Engle, and later shoved through the American Congress.

It is therefore clear who stands to gain from the terrorist attacks and tensions in Kosovo and Metohija. This is evident in spite of the efforts of the Albanian propagandists to obscure the truth by accusing the other side—the official authorities in Serbia.

**Kosovo: 'Over 1,400' Bosnian, Croatian Serb Refugees Settled**

*AU0608154996 Tirana ATA in English 1849 GMT 2 Aug 96*

[Report by B. Jashari]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, August 2 (ATA)—Over 1,400 Serb colons [as received], refugees who came last year from the war fronts in Croatia and Bosnia, have been settled in the Pushe-Kosove commune, according to the latest records.

Most of the refugees say they will stay for ever in Kosova, where special dwelling centers are also being set up.

According to Serb Red Cross data, the Serb colons in Pushe-Kosove have been also provided with jobs. Some 300 Serb refugees have so far been employed in the rail transport enterprise alone.

## Vojvodina

**Vojvodina: DZVM Supports Budapest Conference Statement**

*LD0808180896 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 8 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The only person who did not sign the closing statement of the Hungarian-Hungarian conference held in Budapest by the Prime Minister's Office and the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Borders on 4 and 5 July was the chairman [Andras Agoston] of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM]. He had reservations regarding the definition of self-government and said that the DZVM would sign the statement subsequently, should the DZVM council take a decision to do so. At its latest session the council decided to sign the statement.

According to their news statement, the DZVM supports the statements of the Budapest conference and considers it necessary to continue along the path set by them. The aim is to form a clear picture as soon as possible of what the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin can offer to neighboring Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The DZVM council believes that it is political autonomy based on ethnic grounds, without territorial segregation, on the territories of the above states. The authors of the statement also underline the fact that the DZVM continues to consider their particular model of autonomy to be suitable for this, since it fits in with European processes and could be brought about immediately.

In the statement, which they also sent to the government in Belgrade, they propose talks with Belgrade and Budapest and support Hungarian diplomatic intentions to hold interstate talks on the issues concerned.

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